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Article 
Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of 
Foreignness 
MATTHEW J. LINDSAY 
It is a central premise of modern American immigration law that immigrants, by virtue 
of their non-citizenship, are properly subject to an extra-constitutional regulatory 
authority that is inherent in national sovereignty and buffered against judicial review.  The 
Supreme Court first posited this constitutionally exceptional authority, which is commonly 
known as the “plenary power doctrine,” in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case.  There, the 
Court reconstructed the federal immigration power from a form of commercial regulation 
rooted in Congress’s commerce power, to an instrument of national self-defense against 
invading hordes of economically and racially degraded foreigners. 
Today, generations after the United States abandoned overtly racist immigration 
policies, such as Chinese exclusion and national origins quotas, the Supreme Court 
continues to reaffirm Congress and the President’s virtually unchecked authority over the 
admission, exclusion, and removal of non-citizens, as though such authority were a logical 
concomitant of national sovereignty.  Accordingly, modern judicial defenders of the 
plenary power doctrine generally turn a blind eye to the indecorous racial reasoning 
deployed by its architects.  This Article argues that although the language of race and 
invasion has been purged from the vocabulary, and perhaps worldview, of most modern 
policymakers and judges, the logic of foreign aggression remains indispensible in 
accounting for a power unmoored from the Constitution and shielded from judicial 
scrutiny.   
Throughout the nation’s first century, the Supreme Court found nothing 
constitutionally exceptional about a statute that governed foreigners engaged in the 
process of immigration.  Immigrants’ non-citizenship was incidental to the nature of the 
regulatory authority to which they were subject.  Non-citizenship became a trigger for 
extra-constitutional authority only in the final decades of the nineteenth century, as 
Chinese and “new” European migrants alike increasingly became understood as 
fundamentally and permanently alien to the national character.  This Article demonstrates 
that it was precisely this perception of immigrants’ essential, indelible foreignness—their 
racial difference, their inability to assimilate, their corrosive effect on American 
citizenship—that gave substance to the metaphor of racial invasion, and thus to the 
Court’s analogy between immigration regulation and war.  The Court’s intemperate 
defense of American citizenship against invading foreign races cannot, therefore, be swept 
aside as anachronistic dicta cluttering the otherwise logically sound foundation of 
immigration exceptionalism; rather, it is the cornerstone of the entire edifice. 
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Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of 
Foreignness 
MATTHEW J. LINDSAY

 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1954, the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of a non-citizen 
named Juan Galvan because he had briefly been a member of the 
Communist Party decades earlier, at a time when such membership was 
neither illegal nor grounds for deportation.
1
  Galvan had lived in the United 
States legally for thirty-six years, had an American wife and four native-
born American children, and, the evidence showed, had always been “a 
good, law-abiding man, a steady worker and a devoted husband and father 
loyal to this country and its form of government.”2  Yet for the mere act of 
“joining a lawful political group,” Galvan stood to lose “his job, his 
friends, his home, and maybe even his children, who must choose between 
their father and their native country.”3  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Frankfurter acknowledged that because Galvan was a “person” who 
“legally became part of the American community,” he should, at least in 
theory, be entitled to “the same protection for his life, liberty and property 
under the Due Process Clause as is afforded to a citizen.”4  But Galvan’s 
status as a non-citizen changed everything.  The exclusive entrustment to 
Congress of policies bearing on the right of aliens to enter or remain in the 
country, Frankfurter explained, “has become about as firmly imbedded in 
the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government.”5   
                                                                                                                          
 Assistant Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. M.A. History, University of 
Chicago, 1995; J.D. Yale Law School, 2002; Ph.D. History, University of Chicago (expected 2013).  
For their valuable insights and criticism, I am grateful to David Jaros, Will Hubbard, Kim Reilly and 
Colin Starger.  Katie Furlong provided excellent editorial advice. 
1 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 523, 528, 532 (1954).  Galvan faced deportation under a 
provision of the Internal Security Act of 1950 requiring the Attorney General to deport aliens who had 
ever been “members of or affiliated with . . . the Communist Party of the United States.”  Internal 
Security Act of 1950, Sec. 22 (C), § 1(2), 64 Stat. 987; Galvan, 347 U.S. at 523. 
2 Galvan, 347 U.S. at 532–33 (Black, J., dissenting). 
3 Id. at 533. 
4 Id. at 530.  Deportation was “a drastic measure . . . at times the equivalent of banishment or 
exile,” Frankfurter acknowledged.  Id. (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)). 
Deportation could “deprive a man of ‘all that makes life worth living.’”  Id. (quoting Ng Fung Ho v. 
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)). 
5 Id. at 531. 
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The modern federal immigration power, which is commonly known as 
the “plenary power doctrine,” is defined by two features.  First, Congress’s 
authority to regulate immigration derives not from any constitutionally 
enumerated power, but is rather “an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States.”6  Second, federal laws or 
enforcement actions that bear on a non-citizen’s right to be present within 
the country are buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional 
constraints.
7
  The extent to which governmental authority is 
constitutionally constrained is thus contingent on the citizenship status of 
the person who is subject to that authority, rather than (as would normally 
be the case) the subject-matter or purpose of the regulation involved.  This 
is true even when the constitutional protection at issue—be it the First 
Amendment or the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses—makes no 
distinction between “persons” and “citizens.”8  Indeed, even as Justice 
Frankfurter upheld Juan Galvan’s deportation, he was struck by “a sense of 
harsh incongruity” between the principle that “the Due Process Clause 
[normally] qualifies the scope of [Congress’s] political discretion” and the 
deportation of a long-term resident alien who was innocent of any wrong-
doing.
9
  Ever since the Supreme Court first adopted the plenary power 
doctrine in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case,
10
 it has justified the 
“constitutional exceptionalism”11 of American immigration law with 
reference to the purportedly intricate connection between the admission 
and removal of foreigners and “basic aspects of national sovereignty, more 
particularly our foreign relations and the national security.”12  Despite 
Justice Frankfurter’s misgivings, the Supreme Court continues to reaffirm 
                                                                                                                          
6 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
7 For the classic formulation of the plenary power doctrine, see The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 
U.S. at 606−09; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1993). 
8 See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530–31 (2003) (Due Process Clause); Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488, 491–92 (1999) (First Amendment); Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause). 
9 Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530–31.   
10 130 U.S. at 604.  
11 Scholars and courts alike have long noted and often criticized the constitutionally exceptional 
status of the federal immigration power within American public law.  See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, 
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13 (1996) 
(describing the “immigration anomaly” in U.S. constitutional law); LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS 
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW  245 (1995) 
(observing that immigration is “alienate[d] . . . from other branches of pubic law”); PETER H. SCHUCK, 
CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) 
(characterizing immigration as a legal “maverick” and “wild card”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious 
Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 
COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1704 (1992) (noting the “singularity” of immigration). 
12 Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530.  See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, 
Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 40 (2010) 
for a discussion on the “national security rationale” for immigration exceptionalism. 
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immigration exceptionalism as though it is a natural, self-evident 
consequence of exclusive citizenship and sovereign nationhood.
13
   
This Article challenges the central orthodoxy of modern constitutional 
immigration law that the regulatory authority to which an immigrant is 
subject properly hinges on her citizenship status.  It argues that, 
notwithstanding its aura of naturalness, the legal construction of 
foreignness that underwrites the inherent sovereignty rationale did not take 
shape in its recognizably modern form until the 1880s.  Throughout the 
nation’s first century, immigrants’ non-citizenship was incidental, or at 
least secondary, to the nature of the regulatory authority to which they, as 
immigrants, were subject.  The reasons for this lie largely outside of the 
law.  Until the decades following the Civil War, most Americans shared a 
broad confidence both in immigrants’ moral natures and in the power of 
American economic and political institutions to transform them into 
patriotic republicans.
14
  During this era of relative confidence, the 
individual states reserved significant authority over immigrants and 
immigration under their traditional police powers.  State police authority, 
in turn, depended not on immigrants’ status as foreigners, but rather on the 
purpose of the particular regulation at issue.  As the objects of the state 
police power—as potential paupers or carriers of disease, for example—
immigrants were simply persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and 
welfare of the community was, like that of all persons, native and foreign 
alike, subject to regulation.
15
  Even after the Supreme Court re-branded 
immigrants as articles of commerce in the 1870s to accommodate the 
transfer of regulatory authority from the individual states to Congress, it 
did not distinguish between human commercial goods transported from a 
neighboring state and those transported across an ocean.  The Commerce 
Clause, like the police power, was indifferent to citizenship.
16
 
Immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners only in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century, as Europeans and Chinese migrants 
alike increasingly became understood as fundamentally and permanently 
alien to the American character.
17
  In the 1870s and 1880s, Americans’ 
long-standing confidence in the assimilative power of American 
institutions came into progressively sharper conflict with the economic and 
social realities of industrialization, including the triumph of the wage 
system; the deskilling of labor; and increasingly intense wage competition, 
                                                                                                                          
13 To be clear, the constitutional “exceptionalism” of the federal immigration power lies not in the 
fact that some laws apply only to non-citizens.  Indeed, that is an irreducible feature of regulating 
immigration.  Rather, immigration law is constitutionally exceptional because constitutional scrutiny 
varies according to the citizenship status of the persons being regulated.   
14 See infra Part III.A.  
15 See infra Part III.B.  
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
17 See infra Part IV.C.  
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often from recent immigrants.  As contemporaries grappled with this 
conflict, they generally focused less on these broad structural economic 
changes than on the alleged economic pathologies of immigrants 
themselves—specifically, a disposition toward “uncivilized” standards of 
life and labor.  Without the requisite economic conditions and racial 
material, critics argued, simply exposing immigrants to republican political 
culture and institutions afforded little value as a force of assimilation.  As 
post-Civil War Americans re-imagined their polity as a social and political 
body, the health of which depended on the collective natural endowments 
of its constituent members, immigrants’ foreignness came to signify more 
than merely the absence of citizenship; it became, instead, a token of 
fundamental, indelible moral difference.
18
  The Supreme Court then 
translated the discourse of indelible foreignness into a potent and durable 
rationale for immigration exceptionalism, forging the immigration power 
into an instrument of national “self-preservation” to be deployed against 
invading armies of economically degraded, politically unassimilable, 
racially suspect foreigners.
19
 
Modern judicial defenders of the plenary power doctrine justify the 
political branches’ virtually unchecked authority over immigration as a 
logical concomitant of national sovereignty and, specifically, of the 
President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs and national security.  
Accordingly, they generally turn a blind eye to the indecorous references to 
racial “degradation” and “alien invasion” that color the doctrine’s 
historical origins, as though they were merely anachronistic dicta—the 
rhetorical artifacts of a bygone era.
20
 
                                                                                                                          
18 See infra Part IV.C. 
19 See infra Part IV.D.  
20 See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is 
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign 
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government.” (quoting Mathews 
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81, n. 17 (1976) (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 
(1952)))); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1976) (“Our cases ‘have long recognized the power to 
expel aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments 
largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1952))); 
see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that judicial 
interference with the executive branch’s judgment to detain a removable alien threatens to “undermine 
the obvious necessity that the Nation speak with one voice on . . . foreign affairs matters”).  As the 
citations above suggest, modern judicial affirmations of the political branches’ plenary power over 
immigration tend to rely directly on a series of cases from the 1950s, in which the Supreme Court 
upheld the exclusion or deportation of aliens on political or ideological grounds in the interest of 
“national security.”  Foundational late nineteenth-century cases such as The Chinese Exclusion Case 
and Fong Yue Ting are sometimes buried in a string citation, but virtually never quoted directly.  The 
effect is to launder the racially inflected construction of national “sovereignty” and “security” that 
characterized the birth of the plenary power doctrine through cases that do have a colorable connection 
to national security (as the concept is currently understood) and that lack the doctrine’s original 
association with racially discriminatory immigration policy.   
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This Article demonstrates, to the contrary, that it was precisely the 
construction of immigrants as indelibly alien to the national character that 
gave substance to the metaphor of invasion, and thus enabled the Supreme 
Court to transform the immigration power from a species of commercial 
regulation to a power “inherent in sovereignty, . . . essential to self-
preservation,” and “conclusive upon the judiciary.”21  As much as the 
tropes of racial degradation and alien invasion have been purged from the 
vocabulary, and perhaps worldview, of most modern legislators and 
judges, the association between immigration regulation and national 
security remains essential to justifying a power unmoored from the 
Constitution and shielded from judicial scrutiny. 
It is a staple of immigration law scholarship that the racial construction 
of various immigrant groups, coupled with Americans’ waning faith in 
assimilation, gave rise to restrictive immigration policy, beginning with the 
Chinese Exclusion Act
22
 in the 1880s and ultimately culminating with the 
national origins quota system in the 1920s.
23
  Indeed, Americans’ impulse 
to defend the nation’s political integrity against corruption by racial others 
dates to the Naturalization Act of 1790, which restricted access to United 
States citizenship to “free white persons.”24  This Article contends that the 
erosion of confidence in both the assimilative power of republican 
institutions and the plasticity of immigrants’ moral natures also propelled a 
deeper and more enduring process of constitutional estrangement, 
fundamentally redefining the very authority to which immigrants were 
subject.  Even today, generations after the United States abandoned nativist 
immigration policy,
25
 immigrants’ anomalous constitutional status remains 
                                                                                                                          
Regardless of presidential administration, the executive branch routinely invokes national 
sovereignty, foreign affairs, and national security in support of a robust federal immigration power.  
See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 25, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (arguing that 
judicial deference to the political branches in immigration matters “affords Congress the practical 
latitude it needs to fulfill its responsibilities for national security, foreign affairs, and nation-building”); 
Brief of Respondents at 17, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182) (arguing 
that the federal government possesses exclusive authority to regulate immigration because “the United 
States’ ‘policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with . . . the conduct of foreign 
relations’” (quoting Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 588–89)). 
21 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–06 (1893). 
22 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). 
23 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153, 155 (1924); see SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 28 
(discussing the quota system); ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF 
CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 357–61 (1997) (discussing Chinese exclusion in the 1880s); DANIEL J. 
TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN AMERICA 142–43 (2002) 
(discussing the quota system); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN 
THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 243–45 (2006) (discussing the post-World War I effort to curb 
immigration).    
24 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 
414. 
25 This liberalization includes, most notably, the abolition of national origins quotas in the 
Immigration Act of 1965.  Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965).  
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an axiomatic feature of the federal immigration power.
26
  As a result, even 
non-citizens who, like Juan Galvan, have resided legally in the United 
States for decades lack robust constitutional protections against, for 
example, improper detention during often lengthy removal proceedings;
27
 
selection for removal because of otherwise constitutionally protected 
speech or associations;
28
 or discrimination on the basis of alienage with 
respect to eligibility for public benefits.
29
   
Part II of this Article describes the basic ideological framework within 
which Americans understood and debated immigration law and policy 
throughout the nineteenth century.  It demonstrates that the first generation 
of American statesmen imagined the very act of immigrating to and 
incorporating oneself within republican America as a catalyst for personal 
moral and political regeneration.  This confidence in the assimilative 
power of republican cultural and institutions, in turn, was reflected in the 
relative liberality of the nation’s naturalization laws.30  Part III analyzes the 
history of immigration law and politics in the nineteenth-century United 
States as a history of repeated and progressively sharper clashes between 
the terms of the regenerative model of immigration and the seismic social 
and economic transformations of the industrial era.  It demonstrates that 
throughout the nation’s first century—a period characterized by broad, if 
uneven, confidence in assimilation—the absence of citizenship did not 
operate as a presumptively natural, self-evident marker of legal difference.  
Rather, the Supreme Court, like most Americans, understood the problems 
associated with immigration to be local and discrete.  As such, their 
regulation fit comfortably within the province of the states’ traditional 
police authority, which figured immigrants simply as persons, rather than 
foreigners.
31
   
Part IV analyzes the federalization of immigration regulation during 
the last third of the nineteenth century.  When the Supreme Court 
transferred regulatory authority from the individual states to Congress in 
                                                                                                                          
26 As the Supreme Court said recently, it is a fundamental premise of constitutional immigration 
law that, in “the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 
(2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976)). 
27 See id. (upholding mandatory detention of certain “deportable criminal aliens pending a 
determination of their removability” under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2012)). 
28 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 472–74 (1999) (upholding 
selection of aliens for deportation on the grounds that they were associated with the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine). 
29 See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80 (upholding state welfare eligibility rules disfavoring non-citizens).  
Non-citizens denied entry at the border enjoy no judicially enforceable constitutional protection.  See 
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, 
it is due process.”). 
30 See infra Part II. 
31 See infra Part III.  
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the 1870s, it recharacterized immigrants as articles of commerce.
32
  Yet the 
federal commerce power, like the state police power, was indifferent to 
citizenship.  The national economic importance of immigration, for better 
and worse, defined the nature and scope of congressional authority; it 
mattered not whether the human cargo was transported from a neighboring 
state or across the ocean.
 33
  Even as the Court was anchoring federal 
authority in the Commerce Clause, however, a swelling chorus of 
legislators, workers, economists, and others were condemning the 
degradation of American labor and citizenship by Chinese “coolies” in the 
American West and European “foreign pauper laborers” in the Northeast.34  
It was this critique that propelled both the legal reconstruction of 
foreignness and the Court’s discovery of an extra-constitutional regulatory 
authority that was inherent in the nation’s sovereignty and essential to its 
“self-preservation.”35  The Article concludes, in Part V, by considering 
how this historical genealogy challenges the central orthodoxy of modern 
constitutional immigration law. 
II.  AWAKENING THE “DORMANT SEED OF VIRTUE”:  IMMIGRATION AS 
REGENERATION IN REPUBLICAN AMERICA 
As the first American Congress took up its constitutional charge to 
“establish a[] uniform Rule of Naturalization,”36 it confronted a basic 
conflict between two fundamental but potentially incompatible aspirations: 
the creation of a national political fellowship sustained by the broadly 
shared republican value of “public virtue,” and the revolutionary ideal of 
the American republic as an “asylum of liberty” and a refuge to the victims 
of Old World oppression.  This Part describes how the first generation of 
American statesmen resolved, or at least accommodated, these competing 
aspirations.  They did so, in short, by imagining the very act of 
immigrating to and incorporating oneself within republican America as a 
catalyst for personal moral and political regeneration.  Under this narrative 
of immigration as regeneration, the economic opportunities afforded by a 
                                                                                                                          
32 Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles 
of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 819 (1996).  
33 See infra Part IV.B. 
34 See infra Part IV.C. 
35 See infra Part IV.D. 
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  The early congressional debates that shaped the nation’s political 
posture toward immigration centered not on the creation of “immigration policy” per se, understood as 
the rules governing admission to U.S. territory (e.g., the number of immigrants that should be admitted 
to the country, appropriate criteria for admission, and specific conditions of continued residence), but 
rather the admission of foreigners to American citizenship.  To the extent that there existed a national 
“immigration policy” in the 1780s and 1790s, it was largely one of non-intervention, as Congress 
consistently rejected calls either to deny entry to “undesirable” immigrants, or to offer special 
inducements, such as subsidies and free land, to would-be migrants.  See MARILYN C. BASELER, 
“ASYLUM FOR MANKIND”: AMERICA 1607–1800, 195–98 (1998). 
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open continent and easy access to land, coupled with immersion in 
republican political culture and institutions, would transform the vast 
majority of European immigrants into patriotic American citizens.  This 
narrative provided the basic framework within which Americans would 
understand and debate immigration for the next century, and is essential to 
understanding why, in the final third of the nineteenth century, immigrants 
became strangers to the Constitution.  
A.  The Republican Paradox:  The Ideal of Asylum in a Heterogeneous 
World 
The narrative of immigration as regeneration was deeply embedded in 
the ideology of republicanism that infused the political culture of the 
American revolutionary generation.  For devoted republicans, the 
revolution had accomplished more than political independence from 
England; it had also effected a wholesale transformation in the nature of 
political authority, the character of society, and the spirit of the people.
37
  
Republicans viewed politics as the collective pursuit of a transcendent 
“public good.”38  The people’s representatives would govern not as 
advocates for the “partial” interests of individuals or political factions, but 
as disinterested servants of the entire polity.
39
  This collective submersion 
of private and factional interests required extraordinary moral character on 
the part of the people and their representatives.  Republicans termed such 
character “public virtue,” and it was the soul and lifeblood of 
republicanism.
40
   
Republicans staked the people’s capacity for public virtue to a model 
of disinterested, independent citizenship that could be achieved only 
through economic self-sufficiency.  In the republican worldview, men who 
labored for a wage at the behest of another not only surrendered their 
economic independence; they subjected their personal autonomy and 
political will to the authority of their employer.
41
  True political 
independence, and thus the capacity for public virtue, could only be 
                                                                                                                          
37 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 47–48 (1969) 
[hereinafter WOOD, AMERICAN REPUBLIC] (“Republicanism meant more for Americans than simply the 
elimination of a king and the institution of an elective system.  It added a moral dimension, a utopian 
depth, to the political separation from England—a depth that involved the very character of their 
society.”). 
38 Id. at 53–55. 
39 Id. at 53–59. 
40 Id. at 68. 
41 See DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN 
AMERICA 37–38, 118–19 (1980); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9–10 (1998). 
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achieved through the ownership of real property.
42
  Accordingly, 
Jeffersonians of the 1790s sought to preserve the United States as a 
predominantly agrarian republic of small, independent producer-citizens, 
and to forestall the emergence of a class of permanent wage workers who 
would be too preoccupied with the struggle for subsistence and too 
dependent on their employers to concern themselves with the public 
good.
43
  Jeffersonians thus viewed Alexander Hamilton’s program to 
promote domestic manufactures as a path not to American progress and 
prosperity, but to the kind of mass economic dependency, class hierarchy, 
and political subordination that plagued the manufacturing societies of 
Europe.
44
  Indeed, the perpetual agrarianism of the United States, and the 
personal independence and citizenly virtue that flowed from and sustained 
it, defined the uniqueness of the American republic.
45
   
If faith in the moral character and shared values of the people marked 
the greatness and beauty of the republican vision, however, even its most 
ardent partisans recognized that it was, as historian Gordon Wood has 
noted, “a fragile beauty indeed.”46  The distinctive emphasis on public 
virtue rooted in collective individual moral character counseled caution 
toward immigrants who might “bring with them the principles of the 
governments they leave,” as Thomas Jefferson famously warned in 1782.47  
Refugees from European oppression would transmit “the maxims of 
                                                                                                                          
42 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 178 (1991); 
Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 40–41 
(1987). 
43 See MCCOY, supra note 41, at 109–12.  
44 Id. at 14–15. 
45 This republican exceptionalism came into sharpest focus in contrast to the dual political and 
economic oppressions of the Old World.  In the most widely read tract on America during the 1780s in 
Europe and Great Britain, essayist Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur captured the crux of the republican 
vision from the perspective of a newly landed immigrant: 
He is arrived on a new continent . . . . It is not composed, as in Europe, of great lords 
who possess everything and of a herd of people who have nothing.  Here there are 
no aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no ecclesiastical 
dominion, no invisible power giving to a few a very visible one, no great 
manufacturers employing thousands, no great refinements of luxury. . . . We are a 
people of cultivators, scattered over an immense territory, . . . united by the silken 
bands of mild government, all respecting the laws without dreading their power, 
because they are equitable.  We are all animated with the spirit of an industry which 
is unfettered and unrestrained, because each person works for himself.  
Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, What Is an American?, in LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN 
FARMER AND SKETCHES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 66, 67 (Albert E. Stone ed., 
Penguin Books 1981).  
46 WOOD, AMERICAN REPUBLIC, supra note 37, at 65–66. 
47 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 187, 218 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944). This was true of many future 
Jeffersonians and Federalists alike, as the partisan division that would soon come to dominate 
immigration and naturalization policy (and American politics generally) had not yet coalesced in the 
1780s and early 1790s. 
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absolute monarchies” to their children, who would “infuse into [our 
legislation] their spirit, warp and bias its direction, and render it a 
heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.”48  If the Republic were to 
“wait with patience” for its current population to grow naturally, rather 
than inviting foreigners by “extraordinary encouragements,” Jefferson 
queried, “[m]ay not our government be more homogeneous, more 
peaceable, more durable?”49   
This republican commitment to a “homogeneous” national political 
fellowship sustained by a common pursuit of public virtue coexisted 
uncomfortably with a second core revolutionary ideal: that of the United 
States as an “asylum of liberty” and a refuge to the victims of Old World 
oppression.
50
  Indeed, the American Declaration of Independence, and thus 
the political legitimacy of the American states, was premised on the right 
of the people to withdraw their allegiance to their countries of birth.  
Having thus defined their political revolution as a crusade for human 
freedom, to now prevent the victims of European tyranny from sharing in 
the blessings of republican liberty would be a repudiation of the nation’s 
founding principles.
51
  In the 1780s and early 1790s, moreover, that ideal 
meshed almost seamlessly with the mercantilist worldview of the 
Hamiltonians, under which the acquisition of valuable human capital was a 
vital arena of international economic competition and the cornerstone of 
                                                                                                                          
48 Id. at 217–18.  Because “[c]ivil government . . . must be conducted by common consent,” 
Jefferson explained, the political values of those who unite to form civil government must “harmonize 
as much as possible.”  Id. at 217.  At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Pierce Butler, South 
Carolina’s future United States Senator and himself a former immigrant, declared himself “decidely 
[sic] opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the Country” because they 
brought with them “not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours 
that in every point of view they are dangerous.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 236 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
49 JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 218.  Jefferson thus contested the “present desire of America . . . 
to produce rapid population by as great importations of foreigners as possible.”  Id. at 216.   Nor were 
such sentiments limited to Jeffersonians.  In response to a 1790 proposal “to let aliens come in, take the 
oath, and hold lands without any residence at all,” Massachusetts Federalist and future Speaker of the 
House Theodore Sedgwick denounced the “indiscriminate admission of foreigners to the highest rights 
of human nature, upon terms so incompetent to secure the society from being overrun with the outcasts 
of Europe.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1109, 1117 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  “[T]heir sensations, 
impregnated with prejudices of education, acquired under monarchical and aristocratical 
Governments,” he warned, “may deprive them of that zest for pure republicanism, which is necessary 
in order to taste its beneficence with that gratitude which we feel.”  Id.  
50 JEFFERSON, supra note 47, at 218; BASELER, supra note 36, at 191.  
51 BASELER, supra note 36, at 13.  In the years since independence from Great Britain, insisted 
fellow Republican John Swanwick, 
it had uniformly been the language of this country that we had in the Western world 
opened an asylum for emigrants from every country.  This was our language: “Come 
and join us in the blessing we enjoy, in a country large and fertile, and under a 
Government founded upon the principles of liberty and justice.”   
7 ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1797).  
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national power and prosperity.
52
  As Hamilton explained in 1791, by 
providing “every possible avenue to emigration from abroad,”53 the United 
States would accomplish the dual goals of “opening an asylum to those 
who suffer”54 under Europe’s monarchies and enhancing the young 
nation’s wealth and security by populating the vast, fertile continent with 
“ingenious and valuable workmen.”55  
The first generation of American statesmen ultimately mediated these 
competing postures toward immigration by staking the assimilation of 
Europe’s outcasts to the unique regenerative power of republican society.  
The immersion of foreigners in republican political culture, including their 
liberal naturalization, would transform a motley mass of Old World 
subjects harboring diverse moral and political constitutions into public-
minded, patriotic Americans.  Upon arriving in “this great American 
asylum,” testified the essayist Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, immigrants 
underwent a personal “metamorphosis.”56  The capacity to acquire lands 
and thus become “freemen,” protected by “indulgent laws” that “stamp[] 
on them the symbol of adoption,” will “tend[] to regenerate them,”57 
Crevecoeur explained.  Although some statesmen urged the removal of 
virtually all barriers to American citizenship,
58
 for most lawmakers this 
                                                                                                                          
52 See ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 70.  
53 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED 
STATES ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES 24 (1791). 
54 Id. at 74.     
55 Id. at 40.  Federalist members of Congress, in particular, shared Hamilton’s goals.  During 
debate over the Naturalization Act of 1790, for example, New York Federalist John Laurance explained 
his proposal to eliminate any residency requirement for naturalization.  “The reason of admitting 
foreigners to the rights of citizenship,” he explained, “is the encouragement of emigration, as we have a 
large tract of country to people.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1111 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).  “[E]very 
person, rich or poor,” Laurance declared, “must add to our wealth and strength.” Id. at 1115.  On the 
mercantilist approach to immigration, see BASELER, supra note 36, at 17–18, 152–55, 227–28; 
ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 69–72. 
56 Crèvecoeur, supra note 45, at 68–69. 
57 Id.  The sooner would-be citizens were incorporated into the American political body, urged 
leading Federalist Tench Coxe, “[t]he sooner they become useful members; they then grow attached to 
their new country: they consider themselves as part of it: they adopt the opinions and affections of their 
new brethren, and soon forget they have adopted them, and imagine they are natural.”  Tench Coxe, An 
enquiry into the best means of encouraging emigration from abroad, consistently with the happiness 
and safety of the original citizens; read before the society for political enquiries, at the house of Dr. 
Franklin, April 20 1787, in 10 THE AMERICAN MUSEUM, OR, UNIVERSAL MAGAZINE 114, 115 (1791).  
During congressional debate over the residency requirement for naturalization, for example, 
Pennsylvanian John Smilie rejected the suggestion that “foreigners, by interfering in our present 
political system, will injure or destroy it.” 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 573 (1803).  A long period of 
residency was unnecessary, he urged, because “[f]oreigners . . . will soon be merged with ourselves, 
and instead of introducing among us their sentiments, will soon take up ours.”  Id. 
58 The most idealistic lawmakers urged that any impediment to the American political fellowship 
was inconsistent with the young nation’s professed ideals.  In opposing a modest two-year residency 
requirement for naturalization, Representative John Page explained that “we shall be inconsistent with 
ourselves, if, after boasting of having opened an asylum for the oppressed of all nations, and 
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regeneration was neither instantaneous nor universal.  In crafting a 
naturalization law, prudence thus counseled that immigrants undergo a 
period of probation before being admitted to the American political 
fellowship, both to provide foreigners sufficient time to absorb republican 
values, and to afford the nation an opportunity to assess their moral and 
political character.  After a decade of extraordinary fluctuation in the 
requirements for naturalization,
59
 from a mere two-year residency in the 
Naturalization Act of 1790
60
 to a high of fourteen years in 1798,
61
 
Congress settled on a residency requirement of five years—longer than 
some idealistic advocates of the American asylum had preferred, but still 
remarkably liberal by historical and international standards.
62
  A five-year 
residency “occasioned the safest and surest transmutation,” explained 
                                                                                                                          
established a Government which is the admiration of the world, we make the terms of admission to the 
full enjoyment of that asylum so hard as is now proposed.”  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1110 (1790) (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834).   
59 This fluctuation was the product of the politically volatile, intensely partisan 1790s, during 
which the two political parties essentially reversed their respective postures toward immigration.  
Federalists, most of whom began the 1790s advocating the aggressive recruitment of foreign 
immigrants and their liberal admission to citizenship, had by 1798 adopted a highly defensive position 
on naturalization.  Those who would become Jeffersonian Republicans, by contrast, managed to 
assuage their earlier concern over the anti-republican political values imbibed by Europe’s refugees, 
and became vocal advocates for the ideal of the United States as an asylum for liberty.  BASELER, supra 
note 36, at 243–44.  During this period, relatively liberal requirements for naturalization, including a 
short (or even no) residency requirement and a low (or no) tax on naturalization certificates were 
widely understood both as inducements to immigration and as a fulfillment of the republic’s world-
historical mission to serve as an asylum for the oppressed.  More onerous requirements, including 
longer residency and a substantial tax on naturalization certificates, were believed to check the flow of 
immigration and to guarantee a measure of fitness on the part of those seeking admission to the 
American political fellowship.  See id. at 243–309. 
60 Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 
414. 
61 Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5, 2 
Stat. 153. 
62 Naturalization Act of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153.  Thomas Jefferson’s first message to Congress 
as President, in December of 1801, captures the extent to which Republicans had picked up the mantle 
of liberal asylum.  Having famously worried two decades earlier that immigrants tainted by the 
“maxims of absolute monarchies” would destroy American law and politics, “render[ing] it a 
heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass,” THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 
93 (1853), President Jefferson now recommended that, in the interest of human freedom and economic 
prosperity, Congress reduce the fourteen-year residency requirement imposed by his Federalist foes 
five years earlier: 
Considering the ordinary chances of human life, a denial of citizenship under a 
residence of fourteen years, is a denial to a great proportion of those who ask it; and 
controls a policy pursued, from their first settlement, by many of these States, and 
still believed of consequences to their prosperity.  And shall we refuse to the 
unhappy fugitives from distress that hospitality which the savages of the wilderness 
extended to our fathers arriving in this land?  Shall oppressed humanity find no 
asylum on this globe? 
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 16 (1801). 
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Pennsylvanian Republican Michael Leib.
63
  It would impart “knowledge 
and feeling,” and furnish an “opportunity[] for the intercourse that 
amalgamated the aliens with us, and gave them a common interest.”64   
The relative liberality of the 1802 Act
65
 cemented the regenerative 
theory of immigration as the law of the land, and reflected the delicate, 
self-conscious balance between the republican ideal of liberal asylum and 
the republican apprehension toward political heterogeneity.  This 
confidence in the regenerative power of republican political culture rested 
on a deep faith in human moral nature.  Even the “most vicious in one 
country, . . . being separated from their former connexions, and entering 
into new ones, of a better cast,” instructed the theologian, scientist and 
political philosopher Joseph Priestley, “may become reformed and useful 
citizens.  Our natures being the same, . . . [s]easonable kindness may 
awaken the dormant seed of virtue, especially in a country like this.”66  In 
contrast to Jefferson’s notably darker appraisal two decades earlier, one’s 
moral and political constitution was not stamped indelibly by the 
influences of his youth.  Rather, as Priestley’s formulation suggests, Old 
World immigrants—even those who had imbibed the maxims of 
monarchy—could be reeducated in the principles and spirit of 
republicanism.  Republicans were not born; rather, they were made.   
The narrative of regeneration reflected lawmakers’ hopes and fears 
regarding not only immigration, but the American republic itself.  It 
evinced a certain optimistic, almost self-congratulatory confidence that the 
transformative power of geography and political institutions would 
preserve for all time the core republican values of personal independence 
and citizenly virtue.  Below the surface, however, lurked the same dangers 
that threatened virtuous citizenship generally: concentrations of population, 
a permanent class of “dependent” laborers, and entrenched social and 
political stratification.  As went immigration, so went the Republic.  
Indeed, in the coming decades, the perceived viability of the regenerative 
theory of immigration would, in certain respects, serve as a referendum on 
the vitality of American republicanism itself.  Thus freighted with the 
                                                                                                                          
63 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 576 (1803). 
64 Id.  A period of residency, Leib insisted, rather than a mere oath of allegiance, provided “the 
surest standard by which to test the desire for citizenship; it was action, and not declaration; it was fact 
and not theory.”  Id. 
65 See generally ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 78–98.  The 1802 Act also retained other 
prerequisites for naturalization imposed by Federalists several years earlier that were intended to 
constrain aliens’ political influence and ensure that they gained a proper attachment to the United States 
and its government.  These included requirements that an alien swear an oath three years prior to 
naturalization declaring her intention to become an American citizen; renounce her allegiance to any 
foreign sovereign; and register with a court upon initial arrival in the United States.  Naturalization Act 
of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153.  
66 Joseph Priestley, “A Charity Sermon for Poor Emigrants,” in HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 708, 711 (Edith Abbott ed., 1926). 
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weight of the American Republic, this amalgam of strength and 
vulnerability established the terms in which legislators, judges, workers, 
economists, and political intellectuals would give meaning to immigrants 
and immigration for the next century.   
B.   Aliens, Persons, and Regulatory Authority in the Early Republic:   
The Alien Friends Act of 1798 
The Constitution charges Congress with establishing a uniform rule of 
naturalization,
67
 but it is otherwise silent regarding either the authority to 
regulate immigration or the constitutional rights of immigrants.  The first 
and only sustained analysis of those issues during the Founding Era came 
in the politically heated, intensely partisan debate over the Alien Friends 
Act of 1798.
68
  The Act authorized the President to order the removal of 
any alien, regardless of country of origin, that he judged “dangerous to the 
peace and safety of the United States,” or had “reasonable grounds” to 
suspect was engaged in treason or “secret machinations” against its 
government.
69
  Congressional debate between the Act’s Federalist sponsors 
and its Republican opponents revealed the great extent to which the 
question of whether aliens had constitutional rights was intertwined with 
the question of whether the authority to regulate immigration resided with 
the federal government or the states.   
The Alien Friends Act was a key component of the infamous Alien and 
Sedition Acts, and the most brazen statutory expression of the anti-alien 
frenzy stoked by Federalists in the closing years of the eighteenth 
century.
70
  In defense of the Act, Federalists argued, first, that 
                                                                                                                          
67 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
68 It was so designated in order to distinguish it from the Alien Enemies Act, which was part of 
the same package of legislation and applied only to subjects of nations with which the United States 
was at war.  Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006)). 
69 Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571 (1798). 
70 During the so-called “quasi-war” with France, and amidst mounting apprehensions about the 
growing radicalism of the French Revolution, French conspiracies against American liberty, and the 
infection of American politics by European Jacobinism, Federalists admonished the nation, to great 
short-term partisan political benefit, that the tree of republican liberty would be devoured root and 
branch by alien enemies who had infiltrated the American polity.  See BASELER, supra note 36, at 272.  
The “quasi-war” included the severing of diplomatic relations between the countries as well as actual 
naval combat. ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI-WAR: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE 
UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE 1797–1801 126–30 (1966); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in 
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over 
Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 87–92 (2002).  In the months preceding the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, Federalists in Congress had exploited the nation’s nativist mood to adopt two measures that were 
widely understood to discourage immigration—first, to lay a heavy (twenty dollar) tax on 
naturalization certificates, and second, to nearly triple the residency requirement for admission to 
American citizenship, from five to fourteen years.  See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1797) (discussing the 
tax); Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, § 1, 1 Stat. 566, repealed by Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 5.  
Debate over the Alien Friends Act, including both initial passage of the law and subsequent efforts to 
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congressional—and, by delegation, presidential—authority to remove at 
will politically suspect foreigners was rooted in Congress’s constitutional 
power to defend the nation against foreign invasion; and second, that aliens 
were not entitled to constitutional protections against summary removal 
because they were not “parties” to the Constitution.71  Although the Act’s 
narrow passage marked a short-term legislative victory for Federalists in 
Congress, the Act proved wildly unpopular among the American public, 
and contributed to the Republican electoral triumph in 1800 and the 
subsequent demise of the Federalist Party.
72
  In fact, the constitutional 
arguments advanced by Republicans in opposition to expansive federal 
authority over immigration better reflected mainstream political and legal 
opinion both at the time and in subsequent decades.
73
  After briefly 
describing the Federalist argument in support of the Alien Friends Act, this 
Section therefore turns its focus to the constitutional arguments developed 
by the Act’s Republican opponents.   
Both supporters and critics of the Act recognized that it granted to the 
President extraordinary discretionary power.  In rebuttal to Republican 
charges that the Act usurped the rightful, inherent authority of the states to 
regulate the presence of foreigners within their territory, Federalists lodged 
the constitutional power to expel foreigners squarely in Congress’s duty of 
national self-defense.
74
  The Constitution was designed to “embrace all our 
exterior relations,” explained Massachusetts Federalist Harrison Gray Otis, 
the leading congressional critic of liberal immigration policies.
75
  “The 
great objects of peace and war, negotiations with foreign countries, the 
                                                                                                                          
repeal it, spanned two sessions of Congress and spilled into the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures, 
which adopted resolutions drafted by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, respectively, forcefully 
denouncing the Act on constitutional grounds.  See THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799–1800, TOUCHING 
THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS; TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 
1798 22–23, 162–67 (1850). 
71 See 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2987 (1799) (“[T]he Constitution was made for citizens, not for 
aliens, who of consequence have no rights under it.”).   
72 As the historian Marilyn Baseler writes, “[t]he election of 1800 was a referendum on—and a 
repudiation of—the Federalist ‘doctrines’ enunciated in the debates” over, among other things, the 
Alien Friends and Naturalization Acts of 1798.  BASELER, supra note 36, at 287. 
73 As Baseler explains, “Subsequent Republican victories in the early nineteenth century validated 
their principles and vision for the future of the United States, whereas the Federalist principles and 
pronouncements of the late 1790s were increasingly seen as archaic holdovers or temporary aberrations 
induced by ‘wartime’ hysteria.”  Id. at 288. 
74 A House Report assessing the constitutionality of the Alien Friends Act explained:  
The right of removing aliens, as an incident to the power of war and peace, 
according to the theory of the Constitution, belongs to the Government of the United 
States. . . . Congress is required to protect each State from invasion, and is vested . . . 
with [the] power to . . . remove from the country, in times of hostility, dangerous 
aliens, who may be employed in preparing the way for invasion. 
9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2986 (1799).  The Act’s principle congressional advocates echoed this rationale. 
75 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1986 (1798). 
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general peace and welfare of the United States,” Otis maintained, “must be 
provided for and maintained by the National Government.”76  State 
authority must therefore “vanish before the obligation of the General 
Government to provide for the common defence.”77  An exceptional, 
imminent foreign threat to the nation’s security warranted a 
constitutionally extraordinary power to expel foreigners.
78
  
Federalists simultaneously denied that aliens even possessed the 
constitutional criminal rights that the Act was alleged to abridge, including 
the right to an indictment, to trial by jury, and to confront witnesses against 
them.  “[T]he asylum given by a nation to foreigners [was] a mere matter 
of favor”79 rooted in the government’s policy of “courtesy and 
humanity,”80 Otis maintained, rather than in any “claim [of] equal rights.”81  
He found nothing in the Constitution “which bound us to fraternize with 
the whole world,” and condemned Republicans’ “very erroneous 
hypothesis, that aliens are parties to our Constitution, that it was made for 
their benefit as well as our own and that they may claim equal rights and 
privileges with our own citizens.”82   
If the adoption of the Alien Friends Act represented a dramatic short-
term political triumph for the Federalist Party, however, it proved virtually 
inconsequential as a matter of national policy.
83
  The long-term importance 
of the Act lay instead in the galvanizing effect that it had on Republicans, 
spurring them to develop competing, and ultimately much more influential, 
accounts of the constitutional status of immigrants and governmental 
authority over immigration.  Republican House leaders Edward Livingston 
of New York and Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania spearheaded the 
opposition to the Act.  They refuted at length the dual Federalist 
contentions that foreigners lacked constitutional rights, and that the 
Constitution permitted the federal Congress and President to usurp the 
                                                                                                                          
76 Id. at 1986. 
77 Id.  Otis continued: “[N]o other authority is competent to these great duties; no other can judge 
of the necessity of measures preparatory to the national defence, nor enforce such measures with 
general effect.”  Id.  
78 See, e.g., 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1987 (1798)  (“If we find men in this country endeavoring to 
spread sedition and discord; who have assisted in laying other countries prostrate; whose hands are 
reeking with blood, and whose hearts rankle with hatred towards us—have we not the power to shake 
off these firebrands?”); id. at 1992 (“Are we to wait . . . until the dagger is plunged into our bosoms, 
before we take any means of defence?”). 
79 Id. at 2986.   
80 Id. at 2019; see also id. at 1983 (stating that the United States’s authority “to withdraw their 
protection to aliens . . . is bounded only by sound discretion”). 
81 Id. at 2018. 
82 Id. (“[U]pon reading the Constitution, [Otis] found that ‘we, the people of the United States,’ 
were the only parties concerned in making that instrument. . . . [U]ntil [foreigners are] entitled [to 
American citizenship,] they cannot complain of any breach of our Constitution.”).   
83 The Act expired by its own terms after two years, in 1800, and no alien was ever deported 
under the Act.  See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES:  FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 33 (2004); ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 310.    
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authority of the states to regulate immigration.
84
  Republicans rejected the 
argument made by Otis and others that “the Constitutional compact was 
made between citizens only, and that, therefore, its provisions were not 
intended to extend to aliens.”85  “[T]he Constitution expressly excludes any 
. . . distinction between citizen and alien,” Livingston maintained, and it 
was “an acknowledged principle of the common law . . . that alien friends  
. . . residing among us, are entitled to the protection of our laws.”86  
Citizens and aliens alike thus enjoyed “the same equal distribution of 
justice [and] . . . the same humane provision to protect their innocence.”87  
So indistinguishable was the constitutional status of aliens and citizens, 
Livingston warned, that the same rationale for subjecting “a few 
unprotected aliens” to the Act’s “inquisitorial power” would “apply with 
equal strength . . . in the case of citizens.”88  The same “plea of necessity,” 
he warned, could justify the banishment of both.
89
   
Republicans condemned the bill as a frontal assault on the 
Constitution—a “sacrifice of the first-born offspring of freedom . . . by 
those who gave it birth”90—that violated the fundamental tenets of both 
separation of powers and federalism.  By withholding constitutional 
criminal rights from the “accused,” and vesting the unchecked discretion to 
judge “dangerousness” in the person of the President, critics charged, the 
Act transferred judicial power from the courts to the Executive.
91
  The 
effect was to “confound these fundamental powers of Government, vest 
them all in . . . unqualified terms in one hand, and thus subvert the basis on 
which our liberties rest.”92   
Republicans voiced even greater concern, however, over Congress’s 
invocation of its constitutional authority to wage war and repel invasion.  
“[I]nstead of being bound by a Constitution,” a Congress acting under a 
                                                                                                                          
84 Infra notes 86–101 and accompanying text. 
85 Id. at 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2012 (1798). 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  
88 Id. at 2013. 
89 Id.  By the terms of the Constitution, Livingston continued,  
“all crimes” are to be tried by jury; “no person” shall be held to answer unless on 
presentment; in all “criminal prosecutions” the “accused” is to be informed of the 
nature of the charge; to be confronted with the witness against him; . . . and is to be 
allowed counsel for his defence.  Unless, therefore, we can believe that the 
treasonable machinations and the other offenses described in the bill are not 
“crimes;” that an alien is not a “person;” and that one charged with treasonable 
practices is not “accused” . . . we must allow that all these provisions extend equally 
to aliens and natives, and that the citizen has no other security for his personal safety 
than is extended to the stranger who is within his gates. 
Id.  
90 Id. at 2015.  
91 Id. at 1013–15. 
92 Id. at 2007–08. 
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virtually unrestrained war power could “justify any measure [it] may 
please to adopt,” though in fact impelled by mere “suspicions, alarms, 
popular clamor, private ambition, and by the views of fluctuating 
factions.”93  As a consequence, “all the reserved powers of the people or of 
the States will be swallowed up at [Congress’s] pleasure by that undefined 
discretion.”94  Because “[t]he Constitution gives to Congress no power 
over aliens, except that of naturalization,” Republicans maintained, the 
power “remains with the States to give to aliens the rights of denizens.”95  
Several representatives recalled that the Declaration of Independence 
included in its list of grievances the British Crown’s hindering of foreign 
immigration to the American colonies.
96
  Notably, even Federalist 
supporters of the Act conceded that under normal circumstances “the 
power of admitting foreigners . . . remained with the states.”97   
And indeed, Republicans noted that state legislatures had long acted on 
the presumption that the individual states had “reserved to themselves the 
power of regulating what relates to emigrants.”98  That presumption, 
moreover, was rooted in the fundamentally local nature of immigration 
policymaking, shaped, as it was, by the specific demographic and 
economic circumstances within each state.  While “States whose 
population is full, and to which few migrations take place, are little 
concerned” with the bill’s potential to discourage immigration, urged 
Gallatin, it was of great “consequence . . . to those States whose population 
is thin, and whose policy it has always been to encourage emigration.”99  
By way of illustration, Republicans cited various laws that had been passed 
by their respective state legislatures “for the express encouragement of 
emigration.”100  “Not only in some States have aliens been enabled to 
purchase, to hold, to inherit, and to leave by will, real estates,” Gallatin 
recounted, “but many have actually been admitted in some States . . . to all 
                                                                                                                          
93 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2996 (1799) (statement of Rep. Gallatin). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 2000.  Gallatin acknowledged that “Congress has the power to declare war, and to punish 
any persons guilty of treasonable practices,” but insisted that “what relates to aliens as suspicious 
characters, the Government of the United States has no cognizance of.” 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1977 
(1798). 
96 See, e.g., 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2023 (1799) (statement of Rep. Smith); id. at 1983 (statement of 
Rep. Gallatin). 
97 Id. at 1986 (statement of Rep. Otis); see also id. at 1991 (statement of Rep. Harper) 
(“allow[ing] that the States have a right to admit such foreigners as they think proper till a certain 
period” but insisting that “the General Government is, in the meantime, charged with the common 
defence”). 
98 Id. at 2022 (statement of Rep. Smith). 
99 Id. at 1982. 
100 Id. at 2022 (statement of Rep. Smith); see also id. at 1982 (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“It had 
been an established principle in Pennsylvania, from its first establishment to the present time [to hold 
out] every encouragement . . . to emigrants of all nations.”). 
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the rights of citizens of those states.”101     
Congressional debate surrounding the Alien Friends Act reveals the 
great extent to which the first generation of American statesmen 
understood foreign immigration to implicate fundamentally local, rather 
than national, concerns.  In all but the most exceptional circumstances, 
Republicans and Federalists agreed, foreign migrants were properly subject 
to state, rather than federal, authority. 
III.  AN UNEXCEPTIONAL POWER:  IMMIGRANTS AS PERSONS  
IN THE ERA OF CONFIDENCE 
The history of immigration law and politics in the nineteenth century 
is, in an important respect, a history of repeated and progressively sharper 
clashes between the regenerative model of assimilation and the seismic 
social and economic transformations of industrial era: the concentration of 
population and industry; the emergence of a permanent, “dependent” 
wage-earning class; and, finally, the shifting origin of America’s 
immigrants.  In the eight decades between the nation’s founding and the 
Civil War, Americans’ relative confidence in the transformative power of 
immigration and in immigrants’ capacity for moral and political 
regeneration directly shaped both the political construction of immigrants 
and their legal identity as objects of regulation.  During that period, the 
perceived viability of the regenerative theory of immigration served as a 
referendum on the vitality of American republicanism itself.  As went 
immigration, so went the Republic.     
This Part analyzes the relationship between Americans’ relative faith 
in assimilation, the regulatory construction of immigrants, and the 
evolution of state and federal authority to govern immigrants and 
immigration.  Section A describes the ongoing defense and adaptation of 
the regenerative model of immigration in the face of social and economic 
changes that threatened to upend its core republican premises.  Section B 
then explains that throughout the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century 
both the interests implicated and problems caused by foreign immigration 
were understood by state governments and, to a point, by the United States 
Supreme Court, in fundamentally local terms that warranted state, as 
opposed to federal, regulation.  States thus reserved substantial authority to 
regulate immigration under their traditional police powers.  The state 
police power figured immigrants not as foreigners per se, but rather as 
persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the community 
was governed under the same terms as that of citizens.  
                                                                                                                          
101 Id. at 3000 (statement of Rep. Smith); see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2022–23 (1798) 
(statement of Rep. Smith).  
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A.  Immigrants as Americans in Waiting 
The narrative of immigration as regeneration imagined the republican 
system itself, as well the economic arrangements on which that system 
rested, as a great hopper of assimilation with the capacity to transform the 
oppressed dregs of the Old World into patriotic republicans.  The 
regeneration narrative evinced a certain optimistic, almost self-
congratulatory confidence that the transformative power of geography and 
political institutions would preserve for all time the core republican values 
of personal independence and citizenly virtue.  Notwithstanding the 
hopper’s tremendous power, however, its machinery was also remarkably 
fragile.  Its effectiveness depended entirely on the integrity of its various 
constituent parts: independent, virtuous citizenship rooted in individual 
economic proprietorship; the immersion of immigrants in social and 
political institutions that promoted the adoption of republican values; and 
finally, the moral and political natures of immigrants themselves. These 
were the essential conditions of the nation’s liberal immigration and 
naturalization policy, and virtually from the beginning they appeared 
threatened by the same dangers that jeopardized virtuous republican 
citizenship generally:  concentrations of population in great manufacturing 
centers; the clustering of immigrants into ethnic enclaves where, instead of 
assimilating, they allegedly formed distinct political identities and interests 
defined by their shared national origins; and finally, the emergence of a 
permanent class of “dependent” laborers. 
Over the first half of the nineteenth century, even as Americans 
developed progressively sharper critiques of immigration, they 
nevertheless retained a basic faith in the fundamental moral natures of 
immigrants and in the capacity of American economic and political 
institutions to transform foreign migrants into patriotic republicans.  The 
problems associated with European immigration were generally considered 
fatal neither to the nation’s historically liberal immigration and 
naturalization policy, nor to the regeneration narrative that underwrote that 
liberality.  So long as immigrants were properly diffused throughout the 
nation, contemporaries maintained, the warm bath of economic freedom 
and republican political fellowship would dissolve away the residue of Old 
World economic and political oppression, and infuse them with economic 
and political independence, habits of strenuous labor, and devotion to their 
adopted nation.  It was only in the late 1840s and 1850s  that a politically 
robust nativist movement gained broad support and political influence.  
There began to take hold a critique of immigrants as fundamentally, 
irredeemably foreign, animated by a deep suspicion that they either carried 
no “dormant seed of virtue” as a matter of nature, or, if they once had, that 
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it had atrophied beyond any hope or revival.
102
  Although the nativist 
movement was ultimately unsuccessful in its primary policy demand—the 
extension of the period of residency required for naturalization—and was 
soon swallowed up by the Civil War and the increased demand for 
immigrant labor, it nevertheless represents an important chapter in the 
legal construction of foreignness.  This Section describes the defense and 
adaptation of the narrative of immigration as regeneration during the first 
half of the nineteenth century, and how that narrative was strained, but not 
broken, during the nativist crescendo of the 1850s.  
1.  Challenges of Assimilation in the Young Republic  
In an 1835 article published in the prestigious North American Review, 
Henry Duhring, a German immigrant, prominent Philadelphia merchant, 
and well known writer, crystallized both the mounting political and 
ideological challenges posed by the swelling tide of poor immigrants, and 
the ways in which Americans adapted and qualified the national 
regeneration narrative in order to meet those challenges.  Duhring 
cautioned that, in recent decades, as the United States had become “the 
natural and undoubted receptacle of the surplus population of Europe,”103 
Americans had been so “keenly engrossed by the task of counting our 
rapidly multiplying millions”104 that they had failed to grasp the emerging 
threat to American social and political institutions.  In order to preserve the 
American “sanctuary” as “the best and perhaps last hope of the human 
family,” Duhring urged the nation to exercise some “regulating 
superintendence” over “the enormous influx of foreign emigrants.”105  
Should the nation neglect to do so, he concluded, “our social character be 
liable to be infected by the vices and misery of older countries, from a too 
rapid absorption of their redundant population, or our political institutions 
exposed to overthrow and corruption by the undue accession of 
unassimilating elements.”106  Notwithstanding his call to action, however, 
Duhring maintained the two basic faiths that underlay the nation’s tradition 
of immigration liberalism: first, that the vast majority of the nation’s 
immigrants shared with Americans a fundamental moral nature, and thus 
the capacity for regeneration; and second, that the nation’s great 
assimilationist hopper would continue to transform Europe’s “surplus 
population” into patriotic republicans. 
The problem, Duhring explained, was that the “residue”107 of the 
                                                                                                                          
102 See Priestley, supra note 66, at 711 (using the phrase “dormant seed of virtue” to describe the 
redeemable moral natures of Old World immigrants).  
103 Henry Duhring, Immigration, 40 N. AM. REV. 457, 459 (1835).   
104 Id. at 458. 
105 Id. at 459.  
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 461. 
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immigrant stream too often settled in the nation’s port cities, where, “so far 
from being speedily and systematically absorbed into the mass of the 
native population and dispersed throughout the country, they are allowed 
by the neglect or indifference of the nation to collect in masses and to settle 
upon particular points of the body politic.”108  There they remained 
“insulated from all the friendly influences of the society into which they 
have been transplanted,” unable to “undergo that nationalizing process, 
which can only result from intimate and friendly contact in the walks of 
private business and domestic life.”109  The problem was especially acute 
among Irish immigrants, who had been reduced by “destitution and 
misery” to a “state of disqualification for every pursuit of laborious and 
persevering industry”110 and were “most inclined to linger about the cities 
by which they have been first received.”111  The condition was not unique 
to the Irish peasantry, however.  “[B]y robbing labor of its just fruits, and 
diverting so large a portion to the supply of the church and state,” Duhring 
explained, the governments of Europe had “deprived the individual of a 
just reliance upon his own resources and prevented the acquisition of those 
habits of patient and unremitted application, which can scarcely be 
implanted with success, except in early life and by the animating 
expectation of a fair and certain profit on personal effort.”112  As there was 
                                                                                                                          
108 Id. at 464.   
109 Id. at 461–62.  The Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of New York similarly 
lamented the mass of poor immigrants who, upon arrival in New York, “instead of seeking the interior, 
. . . cluster in our cities, or sojourn along our sea-board, depending on the incidents of time, charity, or 
depredation, for subsistence.”  SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 
ON THE MANAGERS OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF PAUPERISM IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
DEC. 29, 1819, TO WHICH IS ADDED AN APPENDIX, ON THE SUBJECT OF PAUPERISM 19 (1920) 
[hereinafter SECOND ANNUAL REPORT]. 
110 Duhring, supra note 103, at 469.  The Irish were frequently singled out for their alleged 
difficulties in assimilating.  Francis Lieber, the noted jurist, political economist and public intellectual, 
explained that, because the “great and laudable desire” of a German immigrant “is always to get a form, 
and to own it,” he “generally remains in a large city only so long as he cannot help it.”  The Irish, 
however, were “very different.”  “[T]hey prefer the cities, and wherever you meet with a populous 
place in the United States . . . you are sure to find a great number of poor Irish in and about it.”  1 
FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN AMERICA 84–85 (1835).  They likewise “clan more together than 
the emigrants from any other nation,” Lieber observed.  2 FRANCIS LIEBER, THE STRANGER IN 
AMERICA 40 (1835).  Timothy Dwight, the renowned theologian and President of Yale College, voiced 
a typical critique of the Irish character:  “From their extreme ignorance, their apprehensions concerning 
moral obligation must be essentially defective; and this defectiveness must be increased by the 
doctrines taught in the Romish church concerning absolution, indulgences, and other licentious tenets.”  
3 TIMOTHY DWIGHT, TRAVELS; IN NEW-ENGLAND AND NEW-YORK 533 (1822).  Even the character of 
the Irish, however, by consensus the least assimilable of America’s immigrants, was understood to be 
morally redeemable.  The various “evils” associated with Irish immigrants, Dwight explained, were 
“not . . . derived from the native character of these people.”  The Irish were “[un]surpassed in native 
activity of mind, sprightliness, wit, good-nature, generosity, affection, and gratitude.  Their peculiar 
defects, and vices . . . are owing to the want of education, or to a bad one.”  Id. 
111 Duhring, supra note 103, at 466. 
112 Id. at 461. 
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“no charm in the middle passage to remove from [their] character the 
impress of recklessness and ignorance,”113 such immigrants “landed on the 
quays of New York, Boston or Philadelphia” in a state of arrested moral 
development.
114
  
To awaken in each immigrant the dormant seed of virtue, Duhring 
counseled, Americans needed to instill in him the value of “property and 
independence.”115  In order to set the immigrant on “a course of rigorous 
self-denial and strenuous exertion,” it was “necessary to implant in him a 
taste for many of the gratifications of life to which he has hitherto been a 
stranger, and to enlarge the scope of his purposes beyond the mere support 
of a reckless and precarious existence.”116  Such moral rehabilitation could 
only be accomplished by placing each immigrant “in direct subordination 
to the habits, genius and character of American society,” which would 
provide a vital “species of national education.”117  The essential first step 
was to procure for each immigrant “some situation where he shall be 
detached . . . from the seductions incident to large cities, [and] brought into 
direct contract with American habits and industry,” so that he may be 
“fixed in his attachment to the country, and enlightened with respect to his 
rights, his interests, and his duties.”118  Only by immersing himself in “the 
pursuits of the community,” Duhring explained, would the immigrant 
“become identified with its interests, and by some experience of its 
benefits, . . . devote to it, not merely his fealty, but his affections.”119  
Duhring proposed that the United States take certain affirmative 
measures to “facilitate the transit of the emigrant from the sea-port to the 
interior, and to promote . . . his safe and speedy resolution into the political 
and social body, of which he is to be thenceforward a constituent 
portion.”120  In order to promote the efficient diffusion and digestion of 
foreigners, Duhring recommended the formation of “a very extensive and 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. at 469. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 469–70. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 461. 
118 Id. at 474.  Immigrant aid societies, too, identified the tendency of recently landed immigrants 
to congregate in cities as the principal impediment to assimilation, and urged immigrants to travel 
immediately to the less densely populated lands of the West.  See, e.g., SHAMROCK SOC’Y OF N.Y., 
EMIGRATION TO AMERICA: HINTS TO EMIGRANTS 16 (London, MacDonald & Son 1817) (“[W]e think 
that young men, whose habits are not fixed, cannot pass too speedily to the fine regions beyond the 
Alleghany.”).   
119 Duhring, supra note 103, at 474.  As the New York Irish Emigrant Association advised, the 
Irish immigrant “will love with enthusiasm the country that affords him the means of honorable and 
successful enterprise, and permits him to enjoy unmolested and undiminished the fruits of his honest 
industry. . . . [H]e will himself cherish, and will inculcate in his children, an unalterable devotion to his 
adopted and their native country.”  31 ANNALS OF CONG. 202, 205 (1817) (statement of the N.Y. Irish 
Emigrant Ass’n, presented by Sen. Nathan Sanford).  
120 Duhring, supra note 103, at 464–65. 
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effective association” to assist the immigrant and to “enlighten[] him with 
respect to the choice of an ulterior destination, and . . . enabl[e] him to 
reach that destination as soon as possible after his arrival in the country.”121  
Such an association should be truly national in scope, “spread[ing] its 
branches into every district and village of the country” so that each 
immigrant may go where “he might be most speedily and effectually 
engrafted into the community.”122 
Notwithstanding mounting reservations about mass immigration, 
Duhring, like most of his contemporaries, thus retained a basic faith in the 
value of immigration to the American nation, the moral natures of 
immigrants, and the capacity of American social and political institutions 
to transform the subjects of Old World monarchies into republicans.  In 
response to proposals to extend the period of residency required for 
naturalization, Duhring maintained that “[f]ive years, under favorable 
circumstances, are perhaps quite sufficient” to relieve immigrants of the 
“moral incapacity” inflicted upon them by the governments they had 
fled.
123
  “Even the throng of less brilliant, but not ignoble minds,” he 
declared, “we welcome as life-giving streams in a thirsty land; as a strong 
and animating testimony to the value of our institutions, operating to the 
assurance of that faith . . . in . . . human liberty.”124   
Even as most Americans retained their confidence in assimilation, 
however, the narrative of immigration as regeneration had acquired a 
heightened sense of contingency.  The easy assumption that immigrants 
would naturally disperse themselves throughout the vast, open American 
continent and be absorbed into the tissues of the body politic had lost some 
of its force.  At the very least, the hopper of assimilation needed to be 
jostled to prevent it from clogging. 
2.  Nativism in the 1850s:  The Origins of Indelible Foreignness 
Americans’ confidence in assimilation suffered its first significant, 
                                                                                                                          
121 Id. at 473.  The Society for the Prevention of Pauperism in the City of New York similarly 
proposed transporting “able-bodied foreigners into the interior,” where they could be provided with 
suitable labor.  SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 26.  Such a program would not only 
provide relief to the cities; the immigrant, “[i]nstead of bringing up his children in idleness, temptation 
and crime, . . . would see them amalgamate with the general mass of our population, deriving benefits 
from our school establishments, our moral institutions, and our habits of industry.”  Id.  
122 Duhring, supra note 103, at 473–74.  As the New York Irish Emigrant Association explained, 
when immigrants—and the Irish in particular—cluster in cities they become “perplexed, undecided, 
and dismayed,” and “the very energies which would have made the fields to blossom make the cities 
groan.”  31 ANNALS OF CONG. 202, 203–04 (1817) (statement of the N.Y. Irish Emigrant Ass’n, 
presented by Sen. Nathan Sanford).  The Association thus requested that “a portion of unsold [federal] 
lands may be set apart or granted to trustees, for the purpose of being settled by emigrants from Ireland, 
on an extended term of credit.”  Id. at 204. 
123 Duhring, supra note 103, at 476. 
124 Id. at 470. 
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though by no means fatal, shock during the wave of anti-immigrant 
nativism that swept the American political scene in the late 1840s and 
1850s.  The so-called Know Nothings (and their formal organ, the 
American Party) rode this wave to widespread, albeit relatively brief, 
electoral success by denouncing Irish immigration, in particular, which had 
surged to unprecedented levels beginning in the mid-1840s.
125
  The 
nativists of the 1850s were ultimately unsuccessful in their declared 
political goal of imposing harsh new restrictions on alien suffrage, 
including lengthy naturalization periods and even post-naturalization limits 
on the franchise.
126
  But their remarkably swift political ascendency signals 
the moment when a critical mass of Americans began to worry that a 
substantial proportion of European immigrants were fundamentally, 
irredeemably alien to the national character.
127
   
To observers with an eye on the nation’s burgeoning cities, the 
confluent problems of increasing economic dependency, intense wage 
competition from foreign workers, and progressively greater 
concentrations of both economic production and population, were seismic 
historical upheavals that threatened to erode the very pillars of republican 
government.  The Jeffersonian republic of economically independent, 
                                                                                                                          
125 See ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 129 (describing the “tidal wave” or European immigration to 
the United States in the 1840s and early 1850s).  On the influx of Irish immigrants during the mid-
nineteenth century, see KERBY A. MILLER, EMIGRANTS AND EXILES: IRELAND AND THE IRISH EXODUS 
TO NORTH AMERICA 280–344 (1985). 
126 See ZOLBERG, supra note 23, at 161–65. 
127 Even observers who did not share the ideological outlook or legislative goals of the Know 
Nothings recognized that the “swelling tide” of often impoverished immigrants “pouring into the 
United States” represented an unprecedented problem.  NYAICP, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1858, at 33 
(1858).  New York’s leading charity, the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the 
Poor, objected in 1852 that, whatever the advantages of unrestricted immigration to the nation as a 
whole, “the disadvantages are mostly felt at the great point of debarkation”—New York City, where the 
“worst part of the refuse class which is thus thrown upon our shores . . . clan together . . . [and cannot] 
be persuaded to leave it.”  Id.  The Association’s complaint echoed the familiar concern that by 
clustering in cities immigrants deprived themselves of the salutary, regenerative effects of full 
immersion in American life and labor.  But it also raised the new—or at least newly menacing—specter 
of a vast, permanent class of foreign poor siphoning resources from the community.  “Our actual 
pauperism consists mainly not only of immigrants,” the Association reported a few years later, “but of 
the accumulated refuse of about two and a half millions of that class, who have landed in New York, in 
the past ten years.”  As the nation’s principal point of entry for foreign migrants, the report continued, 
New York City had “operat[ed] like a sieve, let[ting] through the enterprising and industrious, while  
. . . retain[ing] the indolent, the aged, and infirm, who can earn their subsistence nowhere.” NYAICP, 
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1858, supra, at 36.  Nor was the problem limited to the economic burden of 
supporting thousands of “foreign paupers.”  The unprecedented magnitude of foreign immigration to 
the United States had given rise to a “profound sense of danger” not only to the fiscal integrity of states 
and localities, reported the Massachusetts Legislature, but to the “social and political institutions of the 
United States.”  Report of the Joint Special Committee of the Legislature of Massachusetts Appointed 
to Consider the Expediency of Altering and Amending the Laws Relating to Alien Passengers and 
Paupers [hereinafter Report of the Joint Special Committee] (Mass. Senate Doc. No. 46, 1848), in 
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM, supra note 66, at 584, 587. 
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politically virtuous producer-citizens appeared to be slipping from view, 
crowded off the historical stage by new, characteristically “European” 
forms of economic social and economic organization.  As Americans’ 
confidence in the great hopper of assimilation wavered, critics of the 
United States’s liberal immigration and naturalization policies typically 
invoked two intertwined arguments for curbing the nation’s traditional 
generosity.  First, they argued that the disappearance in recent decades of 
vacant lands and the increasing concentration of industry and population 
had skewed two of the hopper’s integral components: immigrants’ ready 
access to individual economic proprietorship, and their immersion in 
American life and labor.  The effect was to radically impair the capacity of 
American economic and political institutions to transform Europe’s 
outcasts into patriotic republicans.   
Second, and most often, however, critics pointed to the poor quality of 
the raw material that the assimilationist hopper was tasked to digest: the 
fundamental moral natures of immigrants themselves.  A leading 
contemporary chronicler of the Know-Nothing movement, Frederich 
Anspach, was representative in blending an account of changing economic 
organization and settlement patterns with a palpable distain for 
immigrants’ moral constitutions.  When the naturalization laws were first 
formed, Anspach explained, “we were an infant nation . . . with an 
immense territory . . . . It was an object of paramount importance at the 
time, to have our lands occupied, our solitudes peopled, our roads opened, 
and our cities built.”128  Faced with such exigencies, policymakers sought 
to encourage immigration by permitting foreigners to acquire property and, 
most importantly, providing for easy access to American citizenship.  If 
former circumstances warranted liberality, however, “[s]uch is not our 
condition now.”129  In the new, post-agrarian republic, where “[m]uch of 
our territory is peopled, our wide domain is rapidly filling up, our coasts 
are protected, [and] our cities built,” the time had come to “guard against 
the evils which do accompany the unparalleled influx of foreigners.”130  In 
order to prevent hastily enfranchised foreigners from “convert[ing] this 
asylum . . . into a despotism of oppression,”131 Anspach counseled the 
erection of substantial new barriers to United States citizenship.
132
 
If the digestive capacity of the nation’s territory and institutions had 
declined, however, so had the quality of the “unbroken current which is 
                                                                                                                          
128 FREDERICK RINEHART ANSPACH, THE SONS OF THE SIRES; A HISTORY OF THE RISE, 
PROGRESS, AND DESTINY OF THE AMERICAN PARTY 66 (1855).  
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.  
132 See id. at 65 (“[W]e are clearly of the opinion that unless some radical change takes place in 
relation to the admission of foreigners to citizenship, they will work disastrous ruin to our 
institutions.”). 
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pouring its millions upon our soil.”133  “In the infancy of our national 
existence,” explained Anspach, that current bore men “whose souls 
throbbed with aspirations [to] freedom, . . . who either came for conscience 
sake, or in obedience to those noble impulses which inclined them to a 
nation of freemen.”134  In recent years, however, this “state of things is 
materially altered.”135  A large proportion of the present mass of 
immigrants was “unquestionably totally destitute of those elements of 
character, which our laws should require before adopting them as 
citizens.”136  The Irish, in particular, appeared beyond rehabilitation, their 
economic and political independence hopelessly degraded through 
generations of poverty and will-crushing domination by their native 
government and the Catholic Church.  Irish immigrants “evince too little 
force and energy to be arbiters of their own destiny,” observed New York’s 
leading charity, the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor. 
Rather than seek out opportunities in the West, they were “prone to stay 
where another race furnishes them with food, clothing, and labor.”137  The 
rising pauper class was thus distinctly unsuited and unwilling to travel the 
traditional path to assimilation—namely, geographical dispersion.  Even if 
such immigrants could be persuaded to migrate to the interior, the 
Association reported, they were “so pauperized in spirit,” and so plagued 
by “ignorance, and physical and mental imbecility,” that they were “unfit 
to be their own masters.”138  The extraordinary liberality of the young 
republic had been “adapted . . . to the nature of the times and the character 
of the men of that age,” explained Anspach.139  But recent events had so 
                                                                                                                          
133 Id. at 67. 
134 Id. at 66–68. 
135 Id. at 68. 
136 Id.  A Massachusetts legislative committee charged with recommending amendments to the 
State’s laws “relating to alien passengers and paupers” similarly lamented the recent decline in the 
quality of America’s immigrants.  Report of Joint Special Committee, supra note 127, at 584 n.I.  In the 
“earliest years of the government, those who came here were generally persons of education, of 
pecuniary means, industry and character,” who “added to the intelligence and wealth of the community; 
while, as producers, they assisted in developing the resources of the country,” the Committee observed.  
Id. at 584.  By contrast,  
[t]hose now pouring in upon us are wholly of another kind in morals and intellect, 
and, through ignorance and degradation from systematic oppression of bad rulers at 
home, neither add to the intelligence nor wealth of this comparatively new country.  
As a body, they are consumers, and not producers to an extent equaling their own 
physical wants. 
Id.  
137 NYAICP, ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1858, supra note 127, at 36. 
138 Id.  The Massachusetts legislature similarly complained of the swelling class of immigrants 
who “cluster about in cities, and rarely express a willingness to travel to the new settlements west,” 
preferring to rely instead on the state’s “liberally-sustained institutions, . . . to which they cling with a 
tenacity commensurate with their moral debasement, want of self-respect, and abject and needy 
circumstances.”  Report of Joint Special Committee, supra note 127, at 588. 
139 ANSPACH, supra note 128, at 68. 
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transformed “the times and the people” that there was “no longer that 
adaptation which existed at that period.”140  For many Americans, such 
developments laid bare the profoundly contingent quality of the nation’s 
traditional immigration liberalism.   
As much as complaints of unassimilability grew more commonplace in 
the 1850s, however, the view that a large portion of immigrants were 
indelibly stamped by nature as alien to the American character had not yet 
taken hold among a broad swath of the American public, and failed to 
shape federal immigration and naturalization policy.  Indeed, even writers 
who in one breath condemned immigrants’ corrosive effect on the quality 
of American citizenship could, in the next, affirm their faith in 
assimilation.  The renowned clergyman and author Edward Everett Hale, 
for example, described with alarm the “Celtic Exodus,”141 and consequent 
“annual invasion”142 of the United States by “a horde of discouraged, 
starved, beaten men and women”143 whose “inferiority as a race compels 
them to go to the bottom.”144  Within a few pages, however, Hale pivoted 
sharply, adopting a markedly more optimistic vision of assimilation.  
“[T]he country [is] richer for the coming of the foreigner,”145 he declared, 
and “to attain the full use of this gift, the emigrant must be cared for.”146  
Rather than throwing up obstacles to immigration, Hale insisted, the nation 
“must open its hand to receive the offering of Europe.”147  Once here, the 
immigrant should be welcomed warmly into the American political 
fellowship, not as a gesture of national generosity, but as a spur to 
                                                                                                                          
140 Id. at 69. 
141 EDWARD E. HALE, LETTERS ON IRISH EMIGRATION 51 (photo. reprint 1972) (1852). 
142 Id. at 47. 
143 Id. at 52. 
144 Id. at 54. 
145 Id. at 55. 
146 Id. at 56.  Indeed, commentators were just as likely to attribute immigrants’ economic 
dependency—their “charge upon the tax-paying and benevolent citizen”—to the fraud and exploitation 
that they encountered upon arrival in the United States, as to their fundamental natures.  ASSEMB. OF 
THE STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO WHOM WAS REFERRED THE MEMORIAL 
OF THE CITY OF NEW-YORK RELATIVE TO THE LANDING OF ALIEN PASSENGERS, Assemb. No. 216, 
68th Sess., at 5 (1845).  A New York legislative committee could lament, for example, that “alms-
houses, prisons, dispensaries and benevolent societies are kept up at an enormous expense, almost 
wholly for the benefit of foreign paupers and criminals,” yet lay the blame not with the “honest 
immigrant” rendered vulnerable by “ignorance of our language,” but with “the unprincipled mariner’s 
agent or boarding-house keeper; and . . . those who . . . abet them in their wickedness, and both 
contribute largely to deprave and injure, and oppress with taxation our citizens and expose us to every 
thing unworthy of a free people.” Id.  Throughout the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the 
state agencies charged with administering the landing of immigrants understood their primary mission 
to be that of providing needy immigrants with care and support, including “protecting immigrants from 
being looted by thieves or defrauded by deceitful boardinghouse keepers, inland transportation 
companies, freight and luggage handlers, and employers.”  Matthew J. Lindsay, Preserving the 
Exceptional Republic: Political Economy, Race, and the Federalization of American Immigration Law, 
17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 198 (2005) [hereinafter Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic]. 
147 HALE, supra note 141, at 56.   
 2013] THE CONSTITUTION OF FOREIGNESS 773 
assimilation.  “The stranger cannot serve the country while he is a 
stranger,” Hale counseled, but “must plunge, or be plunged, into his new 
home.”148  “He must, for the purpose we seek, profit by the measure of its 
civilization.  He must be directed by its intelligence.  His children must 
grow up in its institutions.  He must be, not in a clan in a city, surrounded 
by his own race.”149  Notwithstanding Hale’s dark assessment of the Irish 
“race” pouring in on the republic, his proposed solution was a familiar one:  
geographical dispersion.   In order to “‘stimulate the [nation’s] 
absorbents,’” Hale urged, “private action and public policy in this matter 
should unite . . . [so] that each little duct, the country through, may drink 
its share, of those drops which some do not taste at all, of the perpetual 
Westward flood.”150  
In contrast to the immigration restriction movement of the late-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in the 1850s even those critics 
who were most skeptical of immigrants’ capacity for assimilation usually 
advocated limiting access to American citizenship rather than excluding 
immigrants from American territory.
151
  Foreigners’ “opinions need to be 
recast before they [can] intelligently participate in public affairs,” wrote the 
Know Nothing Anspach.
152
  “[E]ven a residence of fifteen or more years is 
absolutely essential in most instances before a man can vote 
intelligently,”153 he counseled.  Indeed, to the extent that leading nativists 
sought to reduce the number of immigrants entering the country, they 
proposed to do so not by restricting immigration per se, but rather by 
removing the “inducements” furnished by “[t]he existing laws of 
naturalization, by which the meanest serf of Europe could be converted 
into a voter in five years.”154  This exclusive focus on naturalization stands 
in sharp contrast to the anti-immigrant program of the 1880s and 1890s, in 
which foreign laborers’ very presence on American territory—and 
particularly their participation in the labor market—threatened to corrode 
republican institutions. 
Despite the intensity of the nativist fervor, it faded from political 
prominence as rapidly as it had emerged.  The nation’s enduring, if 
                                                                                                                          
148 Id. at 57. 
149 Id.   
150 Id.   
151 See ANSPACH, supra note 128, at 71 (“There are numerous . . . weighty reasons . . . for a 
change in the laws relating to this subject [of naturalization]. . . . [P]ersons reared on foreign soil . . . 
cannot possibly possess the needful qualifications of citizenship after the few years’ residence which is 
now the only condition.”). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 THOMAS R. WHITNEY, A DEFENCE OF THE AMERICAN POLICY, AS OPPOSED TO THE 
ENCROACHMENTS OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE, AND ESPECIALLY TO THE INTERFERENCE OF THE PAPACY IN 
THE POLITICAL INTERESTS AND AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (Jerome S. Ozer ed., photo. 
reprint 1971) (1856). 
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increasingly cautious, faith in assimilation combined with the surging labor 
demands of the Civil War to submerge for another generation the 
immigration illiberalism of the 1850s.  An 1864 report issued by the 
United States Senate Committee on Agriculture suggested the great extent 
to which Americans’ assessment of immigrants’ suitability for republican 
institutions—their fundamental moral natures—was very much shaped by 
the nation’s current economic circumstances.155  After declaring that “the 
encouragement of foreign immigration [w]as of the highest importance,” 
the Committee proceeded to sweep away the doubts that had mounted over 
the previous decade about both the continuing effectiveness of the 
American hopper of assimilation and the quality of the foreign material 
that the hopper was expected to assimilate.
156
  “The rapid growth of our 
country arises from three causes, equally necessary,”157 the Committee 
reported:  
[F]irst, the extent of unoccupied soil, with a climate and 
fertility not surpassed in any portion of  the world; second, a 
native population, free, hardy, industrious, improved by a 
mixture of the blood of all the European nations, engrafted 
on the anglo-Saxon stock, and incited to great activity by 
institutions offering the highest honors and rewards to those 
who, by industry and merit, deserve them; and third, the 
addition to and absorption into our population of a large 
number annually of immigrants, whose labor adds to our 
annual production an amount increasing at a compound  
ratio . . . . 
158
 
In marked contrast to the pessimism of the previous decade, the Committee 
reaffirmed in one breath the essential plot points of the traditional narrative 
of immigration as regeneration: the transformative capacity of an open 
continent and free institutions, and the suppleness and redeemability of 
immigrants’ moral natures.  
B.  Immigrants as Persons:  The State Police Authority 
As we have seen, during the nation’s first century, immigrants’ non-
citizenship generally did not operate as a presumptively natural, self-
evident marker of legal difference; nor did it trigger an exclusively federal, 
constitutionally exceptional form of regulatory authority.  Rather, until the 
1870s the individual states engaged in substantial regulation of 
                                                                                                                          
155 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON AGRIC., 38TH CONG., REPORT ON THE ENACTMENT OF SUITABLE 
LAWS FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF FOREIGN IMMIGRANTS 1 (Comm. Print 1864). 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
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immigration under their traditional police powers.  The state police power 
figured immigrants simply as persons, whose effect on the health, morals 
and welfare of the community was governed under the same terms as that 
of citizens.  The Supreme Court’s mid-century immigration law opinions 
likewise treated non-citizenship as a relatively inconsequential aspect of an 
immigrant’s legal identity.  After briefly sketching the contours of state 
regulatory practice during the first half of the nineteenth century, this 
Section explores the debate among lawyers and jurists over the proper 
source, scope, and locus of governmental authority to regulate 
immigration, and the body of constitutional immigration law that this 
debate produced.    
1.  Immigration Localism in the Era of Confidence 
Before the 1870s, the federal government exercised very little 
authority over immigration, neither establishing terms of eligibility for 
foreigners’ admission into United States territory nor processing their 
entry.
159
  Rather, the seaboard states—foremost New York and 
Massachusetts—administered the landing of immigrants, and each 
individual state determined the rights and privileges of foreigners residing 
within its territory.
160
  Even in the decade following the Civil War, most 
Americans continued to view the problems associated with mass 
immigration as an acceptable burden to bear in exchange for the 
overwhelming economic benefits reaped from the nation’s traditionally 
liberal immigration and naturalization policy.  Because such problems 
were understood to be local and discrete, the regulation of immigration 
continued to fit comfortably within the province of state police authority, 
under which states and municipalities regulated all aspects of public health, 
safety, morals, and welfare throughout the nineteenth century.
161
  This 
Section maps the logic of immigration localism that shaped the regulation 
of non-citizens for the first half of the nineteenth century.  That logic rested 
on two pillars: (1) a broad consensus that the regulatory challenges and 
                                                                                                                          
159 The national government never acted to exclude any class of immigrants until 1875, when 
Congress prohibited the immigration of prostitutes, contract laborers, or convicts from “China, Japan, 
or any Oriental country.”  Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974).  The only two 
federal regulations adopted before that time—the Passenger Acts of 1819 and 1847—were directed 
toward improving the conditions of passage by reducing the number of passengers per ship.  See Act of 
Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (repealed 1855); Act of Feb. 22, 1847, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 127 (repealed 
1855). 
160 See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal 
Immigration Power, supra note 12, at 13 (stating that “throughout the first two thirds of the nineteenth 
century, the seaboard states, rather than the federal government, exercised primary authority over the 
landing of immigrants”). 
161 On the pervasiveness of police regulations in the nineteenth-century United States, see 
generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).  
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political interests implicated by the presence of foreigners—the problem of 
economic dependency and crime, for example, or the desire to attract 
laborers or settlers—were fundamentally local in nature; and (2) the lack of 
any meaningful regulatory competition from the federal government.    
In an earlier study of immigration regulation in nineteenth-century 
New York, I demonstrated that mid-century regulators’ strong preference 
for state, rather than federal, control over the landing of immigrants rested 
on their confidence in immigrants’ moral natures and in the nation’s 
powers of cultural and political assimilation.
162
  The New York 
Commissioners of Emigration (“Commissioners”)—the state agency that 
administered the landing of three-quarters of the nation’s immigrants from 
its creation in 1847 until 1891—championed European immigrants as an 
invaluable economic resource and the embodiment of free, independent 
labor.
163
  Commissioner Freidrich Kapp, one of the nation’s leading 
authorities on immigration, explained in 1870 that the United States 
“owe[d] its wonderful development mainly to the conflux of the poor and 
outcast of Europe within it”—to “the sturdy farmer and industrious 
mechanic,” who through their “toils and sufferings . . . built up . . . the 
proud structure of this Republic, which in itself is the glorification . . . of 
free and intelligent labor.”164  Kapp’s sanguine assessment of immigrants’ 
moral and economic character was embedded in his, and the nation’s, 
enduring confidence in the regenerative power of free labor and republican 
institutions.
165
   
Indeed, the Commissioners defined their mission to be that of 
preserving immigrants’ moral fortitude and economic independence as 
much as defending the state against the burden of caring for impoverished 
foreigners.  To that end, the Commissioners operated a refuge and hospital 
at New York’s Castle Garden Depot for immigrants who arrived in New 
York destitute or sick, and attempted to protect immigrants against a cast 
of villains that was said to populate the areas surrounding the Depot, 
including deceitful boardinghouse keepers, inland transportation 
companies, freight and luggage handlers, and would-be employers.
166
  
“The problem to be solved,” wrote Commissioner Kapp, “was to protect 
the newcomer, to prevent him from being robbed, to facilitate his passage 
                                                                                                                          
162 See Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 191. 
163 Id. at 195.   
164 Friedrich Kapp, Immigration, 2 J. SOC. SCI. 1, 2 (1870). 
165 To the extent that immigrants were said to endanger the political health of the republic, the 
threat came not from any inherent unfitness for republican government—as many came to believe in 
the 1890s—but rather from their tendency to cluster together, forming political loyalties distinct from 
the interests of the polity as a whole.  The solution was thus not to limit immigration, but to break up 
such ethnic clusters by encouraging, and even providing financial support for, westward migration.  See 
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 197. 
166 Id. at 198.   
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through the city to the interior, to aid him with good advice, and, in cases 
of most urgent necessity, to furnish him with a small amount of money.”167  
He explained: 
For, whenever the poor immigrant is fleeced by rogues, his 
judgment is impaired, his energy is diminished, and in 
general that moral elasticity lost which he needs more than 
ever to start well in a strange land; and thus a heavy injury is 
inflicted on his adopted country, which, instead of self-
relying, independent men, receives individuals who are 
broken in spirit, . . . useless, [and] . . . burdensome to 
themselves and to others.
168
 
For Kapp and the others who administered the state’s regulatory regime, 
dependency and vice among immigrants were not so much foreign imports 
as products of the fraud and corruption they encountered upon arriving in 
New York.  The aim of the Commissioner’s paternalism was thus to 
safeguard immigrants’ moral and economic character. 
With respect to the governance of foreigners already present within a 
state’s territory, non-citizenship only gradually became a constitutive 
aspect of immigrants’ legal identity, over the first several decades of the 
nineteenth century.  Historian Kunal Parker’s study of the legal 
construction of immigrants in antebellum Massachusetts reveals the 
“heavily contested process through which citizenship came to function . . . 
as a barrier to the individual’s right to enter, and remain within, 
territory.”169  In the final decades of the eighteenth century, the specific 
town, rather than the state, “constituted the salient territorial unit,”170 
Parker explains.  “Every individual possessed a settlement in, or ‘belonged 
to,’ a particular town.”171  This meant that an individual “had legally 
recognized claims only upon that town’s treasury for purposes of poor 
relief and legally recognized rights of residence only within the territory of 
that town.”172  Because “[o]utsiders were specifically understood as all 
individuals lacking a settlement in the town, rather than as individuals 
lacking citizenship,”173 town officials did not distinguish between 
“foreigners” who had been born and long resided in a neighboring town or 
state, and “foreigners” who had immigrated to the United States from 
                                                                                                                          
167 FRIEDRICH KAPP, IMMIGRATION AND THE COMMISSIONERS OF EMIGRATION 85 (Arno Press & 
N.Y. Times 1969) (1870). 
168 Id. at 160.  
169 Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants in 
Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 583, 586 (2001). 
170 Id. at 590. 
171 Id. at 588. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.  
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Ireland a month earlier.
174
  Rather, they “remove[d] ‘foreign’ paupers to 
places where they ‘belonged,’” which might be another town within 
Massachusetts, a different state, or “beyond sea.”175  Between the 1790s 
and the 1830s, a combination of historical factors
176
 caused a wholesale 
shift in responsibility for the state’s poor, from the individual towns to the 
state itself, thus radically expanding the number of so-called “state 
pauper[s].”177  Only then, several decades after American independence, 
did Massachusetts respond to the growing burden of poor relief by 
“develop[ing] discourses of citizenship, foreignness, and cultural 
difference that represented resident immigrants’ claims for poor relief as 
illegitimate as the claims of aliens.”178  In doing so, the state replaced the 
logic of settlement with the logic of citizenship, as foreignness—now 
understood as the absence of citizenship—came to signify the illegitimacy 
of an individual’s claims on the commonwealth. 
2.  Constitutional Immigration Law in the Pre-Federalization Era 
This Section maps the contours of mid-century constitutional 
immigration law through two landmark Supreme Court cases: City of New 
York v. Miln
179
 and The Passenger Cases.
180
  Virtually all of the 
participants in those cases, litigants and jurists alike, agreed that federal 
authority over immigration, whatever its extent, derived from Congress’s 
constitutionally enumerated commerce power.  Disagreement centered 
instead on the nature of the authority reserved by the states; in particular, 
under what circumstances a state regulation was preempted by Congress’s 
commerce authority.  This Section argues that, notwithstanding the 
individual Justices’ widely divergent views over where, exactly, the line of 
demarcation between state and federal authority should be drawn, the 
Court consistently drew that line based on the purpose and effect of the 
regulation at issue, rather than the citizenship status of the persons upon 
whom the regulation operated.   
The 1837 case of City of New York v. Miln marked the first time that 
the Supreme Court addressed the power to regulate immigration and, 
specifically, attempted to demarcate the states’ and Congress’s respective 
                                                                                                                          
174 See id. at 588, 597–98.   
175 Id. at 601. 
176 These developments include: the State’s adoption in 1794 of a law making citizenship a 
prerequisite for settlement, thus marking the immigrant poor as a charge of the Commonwealth; the 
dramatic increase of European immigration to the U.S. following 1820; the expanding scale of poverty 
resulting from industrialization; and aggressive, sometimes fraudulent, efforts by the towns to shift 
caring for their own poor onto the state.  Id. at 597, 601–05. 
177 Id. at 602.   
178 Id. at 606. 
179 36 U.S. 102 (1837) 
180 48 U.S. 283 (1849). 
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spheres of authority.  The case involved the constitutionality of an 1824 
New York State law requiring the master of every vessel arriving in the 
Port of New York from outside the state to report the name, birthplace, last 
legal settlement, age, and occupation of each passenger.
181
  Neither of the 
parties nor any of the Justices contested that Congress possessed authority 
to regulate immigration under its commerce power.
182
  The legal dispute 
centered on whether Congress had claimed exclusive authority over all 
aspects of immigration when it adopted the Passenger Act of 1819,
183
 
which regulated steerage conditions on foreign vessels bound for the 
United States, or whether New York instead retained concurrent authority 
to regulate immigrants after they had landed.
184
  George Miln, a shipmaster 
convicted under the New York law, maintained that the reporting 
requirement came into “direct conflict” 185 with the federal Passenger Act.  
New York countered that the reporting requirement was not a regulation of 
commerce,
186
 but that even if it could be thus construed, the State reserved 
concurrent authority to regulate the landing of passengers so long as the 
law did not come into direct “collision” with federal policy.187  A five-
Justice majority rejected Miln’s challenge to the law, concluding that, by 
virtue of the Act’s purpose and object, it was “not a regulation of 
commerce, but of police; and [thus] . . . passed in the exercise of a  
power . . . rightfully belong[ing] to the states.”188 
Echoing the state’s brief to the Court, the majority acknowledged that 
the challenged statute governed the conditions under which foreign 
migrants were landed in the Port of New York, but maintained that that 
                                                                                                                          
181 Miln, 36 U.S. at 130.   
182 Gibbons v. Ogden, decided thirteen years prior to Miln, had established that Congress’s 
commerce authority encompassed “navigation,” regardless of whether the object of navigation was the 
transportation of goods or of persons.  22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).  
183 An Act Regulating Passenger Vessels, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (1819). 
184 New York acknowledged that a “commercial regulation” adopted by a state would be 
unconstitutional if it conflicted with an act of Congress.  Miln, 36 U.S. at 127.  The Court agreed that a 
state immigration regulation “partaking of the nature of a commercial regulation . . . would stand the 
test of the most rigid scrutiny.”  Id. at 139. 
185 Id. at 116. 
186 Id. at 107. 
187 Id. at 126. 
188 Id. at 132.  The Court further reasoned that even if the reporting requirement “could be 
considered as partaking of the nature of a commercial regulation,” it remained within the authority of 
the state so long as it avoided a direct “collision” with the will of Congress.  Id. at 138.  Moreover, even 
state and federal regulations that are “scarcely distinguishable” from one another may not collide if 
they “flow from distinct powers.”  Id. at 137.  Because the most recent expression of national policy—
the Passenger Act of 1819—acted on passengers only “whilst on their voyage, and until they shall have 
landed,” while New York’s reporting requirement applied to persons who had already landed, and thus 
“ceased to be passengers,” the law’s “operation only begins when that of the laws of congress ends.”  
Id. at 138. 
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fact did not impeach its status as a valid police regulation.
189
  The Act was 
“obviously passed with a view to prevent her citizens from being 
oppressed by the support of multitudes of poor persons, who come from 
foreign countries without . . . the means of supporting themselves,”190 the 
Court explained.  For the purpose of defining the scope of the state’s 
regulatory authority, the operative phrase here was not “foreign countries” 
but “poor persons.”191  Indeed, the Court stressed the profoundly local 
nature of the relevant legislative purpose: “New York, from her particular 
situation, is, perhaps more than any other city in the Union, exposed to the 
evil of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there . . . .”192  It was thus 
“the duty of the state,” the Court declared, to defend its citizens against the 
“danger” of “being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance of those 
who are poor.”193  Even though the reporting requirement governed the 
landing of foreigners, it remained quintessentially a poor law, and as such 
“form[ed] a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces 
every thing within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general 
government,”194 including inspection, quarantine, and health laws.  There 
was thus “no mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be 
more appropriately exercised.”195   
The unexceptional nature of the states’ authority to regulate 
immigration is reinforced by the fact that, while the section of the law 
challenged in Miln applied to foreign migrants, the statute regulated poor 
citizens in substantially the same manner, obliging shipmasters to remove 
                                                                                                                          
189 Id. at 141. It is especially revealing in light of the modern presumption of federal exclusivity 
that New York explicitly acknowledged that the reporting requirement constituted an immigration 
regulation.  It had become “obvious” in recent decades “that laws were needed to regulate” the 
“constant and steady migration” of Europeans to the United States, the State explained.  Id. at 106.  
That the law was directed at foreigners and clearly amounted to what would today be classed as an 
“immigration regulation,” however, did not place it in an exclusively federal legislative domain.  Id.  
Because New York had adopted the reporting requirement “to prevent the introduction of foreign 
paupers” into the state, the law was “a part of the system of poor laws,” id. at 110, and thus a 
quintessential police regulation, which “may operate on persons brought into a state in the course of 
commercial operations,” id. at 129, without making it a “commercial regulation in the sense 
contemplated in the constitution,” id. at 110.  And indeed, New York cited hundreds of statutes enacted 
in dozens of states purporting to demonstrate that states had engaged in precisely such regulation since 
the nation’s founding.  Id. at 114–15. 
190 Id. at 141. 
191 Id. 
192 Id.  In its brief to the Court, New York likewise argued that the reporting requirement, by its 
very nature, addressed a quintessentially local interest.  Upholding the statute would “vest[] power 
where there is an inducement to exercise it,” the State explained.  Id. at 114.  Because westerners in 
particular sought “to encourage emigration” and cared little how many impoverished migrants were 
“left as a burden upon the city of New York,” there was “a hostile principle in congress to regulating 
this local evil.”  Id. 
193 Id. at 141.   
194 Id. at 133. 
195 Id. at 141. 
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to “the place of his last settlement” any United States citizen “deemed 
likely to become chargeable to the city.”196  It was thus “apparent, from the 
whole scope of the law,” the Court observed, “that the object of the 
legislature was, to prevent New York from being burdened by an influx of 
persons brought thither in ships, either from foreign countries, or from any 
other of the states.”197  Neither the legislature that adopted the statute nor 
the Court that upheld it distinguished between the state’s authority to 
protect itself against poor Americans and its authority to protect itself 
against poor Europeans.
198
  Notwithstanding the legislature’s clear 
intention to regulate foreign immigration, it was not the citizenship status 
of the persons regulated, but rather the Act’s underlying purpose of 
governing poor persons within its territory that determined the scope of 
state authority.
199
 
Finally, the majority opinion argued explicitly that there was nothing 
conceptually distinctive, let alone constitutionally exceptional, about a 
statute that regulates foreigners engaged in the process of immigration.  
The Court drew a telling analogy between the governance of foreign 
migrants under the challenged poor law and the prosecution under state 
criminal law of recently landed “officers, seamen, and passengers who are 
within its jurisdiction.”200  Just as “[t]he right to punish, or to prevent 
crime, does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of the party who is 
obnoxious to the law,”201 the Court explained, “the same reasons, precisely, 
equally subject [Miln] . . . to liability for failure to comply” with the 
reporting requirement.
202
  Each law depended upon the “same principle”—
“that it was passed by the state of New York, by virtue of her power to 
enact such laws for her internal police . . . ; which laws operate upon the 
persons and things within her territorial limits.”203  This formulation flatly 
                                                                                                                          
196 Id. at 154 (Story, J., dissenting).  
197 Id. at 133 (majority opinion). 
198 Indeed, New York insisted in its brief that to deny states the authority to control the entry of 
foreign poor would necessarily deprive them the ability to turn away domestic paupers as well.  Id. at 
111–12. 
199 The Justices in the majority made clear that the scope of the regulation’s territorial application 
was likewise pertinent.  “If we look at the place of [the Act’s] operation,” the Court reasoned, “we find 
it to be within the territory, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of New York.”  Id. at 133.  To the 
extent that “we look at the person on whom it operates,” it matters only that “he is found within the 
same territory and jurisdiction.”  Id. 
200 Id. at 141.    
201 Id. at 140. 
202 Id. at 141.   
203 Id.  If the power to regulate “the admission of passengers from Europe” is exclusive in 
Congress by virtue of its power to regulate foreign commerce, the power to “regulat[e] the arrival of 
passengers by land” must likewise be exclusive in Congress by virtue of its power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 111.  Under such a construction, the “poor laws, providing for sending back paupers 
to their place of settlement, in the adjoining counties of a bordering state,” would become the exclusive 
province of Congress.  Id. at 112.  And if “congress may regulate passengers from one state to 
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defies the distinction, so crucial to modern constitutional immigration law, 
between the application of ordinary domestic law to non-citizens and a 
distinct class of “immigration laws” that govern the admission and removal 
of foreigners.
204
  
Over the next four decades, the Supreme Court would gradually 
abandon the Miln majority’s theory of concurrent state and federal 
authority to regulate the landing of foreign migrants.  Even as it edged 
progressively closer to a presumption of federal exclusivity, however, the 
Court continued to focus on the purpose and effect of the regulation at 
issue rather than the citizenship status of the persons regulated.  The next 
major episode in the evolving federalism of immigration lawmaking, and 
the Court’s fullest attempt to demarcate the states’ and Congress’s 
respective spheres of authority, came twelve years after Miln, in The 
Passenger Cases.
205
   
At issue in The Passenger Cases was whether similar New York and 
Massachusetts laws requiring the master of every vessel arriving from a 
foreign port to pay a small tax for each passenger—levied to fund a marine 
hospital and to support “foreign paupers,” respectively—treaded 
unconstitutionally into the exclusively federal domain of foreign 
commercial regulation.
206
  A five-Justice majority comprised of five 
separate opinions concluded that it did.  The question turned on whether 
the head taxes were regulations of police or of commerce, and, if the latter, 
whether they collided with the policy of Congress.
207
  The opinions in the 
majority shared two notable features: first, consistent with Miln, when it 
came to defining the states’ and federal government’s respective spheres of 
authority, the Justices were far less concerned with immigrants’ non-
citizenship than with the purpose and effect of the challenged head taxes; 
and second, the nation’s tradition of immigration liberalism informed both 
the legal construction of immigrants and the location of the boundary line 
                                                                                                                          
another,” New York cautioned, “their power will extend to compel the states to permit paupers to pass 
from one state into another state.”  Id. at 130.  Not least, “[t]he laws of the southern states in relation to 
the intercourse and traffic with slaves” would be “abrogated,” rendering the subject “solely of federal 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 111. 
204 See Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 PENN. L REV. 341, 343 
(2008) (observing that immigration law is organized around the idea that “rules for selecting 
immigrants are fundamentally different from rules regulating immigrants outside the selection 
process”).  
205 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). 
206 Id. at 303, 315.   
207 Id. at 322.  At least three members of the majority (Justices Catron, McKinley, and Grier), 
along with the four dissenters, believed that the states possessed concurrent authority with Congress to 
regulate immigration.  For these Justices, the dispositive inquiry was whether the state regulation at 
issue collided with federal policy.  Justice McLean, and perhaps Justice Wayne (whose concurring 
opinion is ambiguous on this point), insisted that because the Constitution vested the authority to 
regulate foreign commerce exclusively with Congress, it thereby prohibited any and all state regulation. 
Id. at 392–410. 
 2013] THE CONSTITUTION OF FOREIGNESS 783 
between state and federal, police and commerce. 
Even as the Court struck down the state head taxes, most members of 
the majority and all of the dissenters affirmed Miln’s basic framework for 
evaluating the scope of the states’ authority to regulate immigration.  The 
purpose and effect of the regulation remained dispositive.  The Justices in 
the majority were particularly bothered by the statutes’ failure to 
distinguish, on the one hand, between immigrants who, due to poverty or 
physical incapacity, were likely to become public charges and, on the 
other, healthy, economically independent immigrants whose migration the 
United States had long sought to encourage.  The majority rejected the 
states’ argument that because a state may exclude “paupers” or “lunatics” 
under its police power, “therefore she may exclude all persons, whether 
they come within this category or not.”208  The head taxes exceeded the 
bounds of state authority not because they applied to foreign migrants, but 
because they applied to all foreign migrants equally, including those who 
posed no threat to the public health, morals, or welfare.  The state “may 
exclude putrid and pestilential goods from being landed on her shores,” 
Justice Grier explained, “yet it does not follow that she may prescribe what 
sound goods may be landed, or prohibit their importation altogether.”209  
The over-inclusiveness of the head taxes appeared to defy their asserted 
regulatory purpose of protecting the state against the burden of caring for 
sick and dependent foreigners, and thus impeached their validity as police 
regulations.
210
  The distinction between immigrants who were fit to 
assimilate into American economic and political institutions and those who 
appeared destined for lives of pauperism and dependency thus took on 
constitutional meaning in the Court’s continuing struggle to define the 
boundary between commerce and police.  Just as the regulation of healthy, 
economically independent immigrants lay beyond the scope of state 
authority, Justice Wayne explained, “[p]aupers, vagabonds, and fugitives 
never have been subjects of rightful national intercourse, or of commercial 
regulations.”211 
If the Miln majority figured immigrants as mere “persons,” The 
                                                                                                                          
208 Id. at 463 (Grier, J., concurring); see also id. at 410 (McLean, J., concurring) (arguing that, 
while each state possesses “an unquestionable power to protect itself from foreign paupers and other 
persons who would be a public charge,” the state exceeded its police authority by extracting head taxes 
from passengers who did not fit that description); id. at 426–27 (Wayne, J., concurring) (arguing that 
the states are forbidden to exercise their police powers “over those who are not paupers, vagabonds, or 
fugitives”); id. at 448 (Catron, J., concurring) (arguing that the passengers subject to the state tax “were 
not subjects of any police power or sanitary regulation, but healthy persons of good moral character”).  
209 Id. at 463.  
210 Notably, it also prompted a charge of injustice toward immigrants themselves.  “The powers 
used for self-defence and protection against harm,” Justice Grier insisted, “cannot be perverted into 
weapons of offence and aggression upon the rights of others.”  Id. 
211 Id. at 426 (Wayne, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Passenger Cases marked their emergence as “subjects of commerce.”212  
The Court had laid the foundation for that construction twenty-five years 
earlier, in Gibbons v. Ogden.
213
  In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall 
famously concluded that commerce encompassed not only “buying and 
selling, or the interchange of commodities,” but also “commercial 
intercourse” more broadly, including “navigation,” regardless of whether 
the things transported were goods or passengers.
214
  For the purpose of 
defining the scope of congressional authority, explained Justice McLean, 
“no just distinction can be made . . . between the transportation of 
merchandise and passengers.”215  Other Justices in the majority similarly 
affirmed that “persons as well as slaves may be the subjects of importation 
and commerce.”216 
Even as the majority figured immigrants as subjects of foreign 
commerce, it was the commercial nature of their voyage rather than their 
non-citizenship that dictated the form of authority to which they were 
subject.
217
  Several of the Justices in the majority insisted that, so long as 
the commercial goods at issue were transported across state lines, the 
Commerce Clause was indifferent to national origin of either the goods 
themselves or the persons engaged in their transportation.  States were 
prohibited equally from imposing a duty upon merchandise “from one 
                                                                                                                          
212 Id. at 432–33. 
213 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
214 Id. at 189–90. 
215 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 405 (McLean, J., concurring in the judgment). 
216 E.g., id. at 414 (Wayne, J. concurring in the judgment).  As this statement suggests, the debate 
among the Justices over the relative authority of the states and the federal government to control the 
landing of immigrants unfolded in the shadow of mounting sectional conflict over slavery.  
Specifically, the mostly pro-slavery dissenters rejected the notion that immigrants could be subjects of 
commerce, at least in part because that view suggested that Congress might also have the constitutional 
authority to regulate other human articles of commerce—namely slaves.  Justices Taney and 
Woodberry, in particular, warned that the scope of the federal commerce power directly implicated the 
ability of the states to regulate the entry into their territory of slaves and free blacks.  If the federal 
commerce power was exclusive of state regulations such as the challenged head taxes, Justice 
Woodbury explained, “all the laws of Ohio, Mississippi, and many other States, either forbidding or 
taxing the entrance of slaves or liberated blacks, will be nullified.”  Id. at 567 (Woodbury, J., 
dissenting).  Chief Justice Taney—who eight years later wrote the majority opinion in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)—similarly worried that if the federal government could oblige states to 
receive immigrants, then “emancipated slaves of the West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to 
reside, hire houses, and traffic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any State law to the 
contrary; inevitably producing the most serious discontent, and ultimately leading to the most painful 
consequences.”  The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 474 (Taney, C.J., dissenting); see generally 
Bilder, supra note 32 (arguing that the Court was unable to reach consensus on the nature of 
Congress’s commerce authority over immigration for most of the nineteenth century because the 
politics and legal culture of slavery prevented some Justices from accepting that immigrants could be 
“articles of commerce”). 
217 See The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 450–51 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(referencing the United States’s commercial treaty with Great Britain as an example of national 
authority to allow foreign entrants into the country). 
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State to another State or [from] foreign countries,” irrespective of whether 
the importers “are citizens or foreigners.”218  The majority likewise 
presumed that a holding with respect to foreign commerce would apply 
symmetrically to domestic interstate commerce.  If New York could lay a 
tax on passengers arriving from Europe, Justice McLean warned, “the 
same principle [would] sustain a right in every State to tax all persons who 
shall pass through its territory on railroad-cars, canal-boats, stages, or in 
any other manner.”219  The consequence would be to “enable a State to 
establish and enforce a non-intercourse with every other State.”220   
For some members of the majority, the fact that the head taxes 
regulated foreign commerce was sufficient to render them 
unconstitutional.
221
  For others, however, the head taxes were invalid only 
if they collided with the will of Congress.
222
  That Congress had engaged in 
very little meaningful regulation of immigration might have suggested that 
the field remained largely open to state legislation—as the dissenters 
argued, either a reflection of Congress’s indifference or an invitation to the 
states to legislate.
 
 Instead, the Justices in the majority interpreted 
Congress’s relative inaction as an affirmative federal policy of encouraging 
immigration.  “From the first day of our [nation’s] separate existence,” 
Justice Catron reasoned, “has the policy of drawing hither aliens, to the end 
of becoming citizens, been a favorite policy of the United States, . . . 
cherished by Congress with rare steadiness and vigor.”223  No state could 
“claim the power of thwarting by its own authority the established policy 
of all the States united.”224   
The specific meaning that the Justices in the majority attached to the 
dearth of federal regulation appeared to reflect each man’s assessment of 
the economic and political virtues of immigration, and particularly his 
relative faith in assimilation.  Through the long-standing national policy of 
immigration liberalism, Justice Catron maintained, “our extensive and 
fertile country has been . . . filled up by a respectable population . . . that is 
easily governed and usually of approved patriotism.”225  “Keeping in view 
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence with respect to the 
importance of augmenting the population of the United States,” Congress 
                                                                                                                          
218 Id. at 417 (Wayne, J., concurring in the judgment).    
219 Id. at 407 (McLean, J., concurring).  
220 Id.  Justice Catron similarly cautioned that if “aliens belonging to foreign commerce, and 
passengers coming from other States, could have a poll-tax levied on them on entering any port of a 
State, . . . the great inlets of commerce might raise all necessary revenues from foreign intercourse, and 
from intercourse among the States.”  Id. at 448 (Catron, J., concurring).   
221 See supra note 207.  
222 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 434 (Wayne, J., concurring). 
223 Id. at 440 (Catron, J., concurring in the judgment).  
224 Id. at 443.  
225 Id. at 440. 
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had frequently passed laws “to facilitate and encourage . . . the 
immigration of Europeans into the United States.”226  It was evident from 
the “repeated and well-considered acts of legislation,” including the 
Passenger Act of 1819 and various laws exempting from duties certain 
household items and workmen’s tools, that “Congress has covered, and has 
intended to cover the whole field of legislation over this branch of 
commerce.”227  Noting the nation’s “many millions of acres of vacant 
lands,” Justice Grier similarly found it impossible to conclude that “the 
framers of our Constitution had committed such an oversight, as to leave it 
to the discretion of some two or three States to thwart the policy of the 
Union, and dictate the terms upon which foreigners shall be permitted” to 
settle here.
228
  Indeed, it remained “the cherished policy of the general 
government to encourage and invite Christian foreigners of our own race to 
seek an asylum within our borders, and to convert these waste lands into 
productive farms, and thus add to the wealth, population, and power of the 
nation.”229 
This Part has demonstrated that, during the eight decades between the 
nation’s founding and the beginning of the Civil War, Americans’ broad 
confidence in immigrants’ fundamental moral natures and in the power of 
American economic and political institutions to transform them in to 
patriotic republicans directly shaped both the political construction of 
immigrants and their legal identity as objects of regulation.  Throughout 
this period, the Supreme Court figured immigrants not as foreigners, but 
simply as persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the 
community was, like that of other persons, citizens and non-citizens alike, 
subject to the police power of the individual states.  Even after the Court 
redefined immigrants as articles of foreign commerce in the 1870s, the 
Commerce Clause, like the police power, remained indifferent to 
citizenship. 
IV.  FROM COMMERCE TO SOVEREIGNTY:  FEDERAL AUTHORITY IN THE 
POST-CIVIL WAR ERA 
As we have seen, for the first century of the nation’s history, the 
absence of American citizenship did not trigger a constitutionally 
exceptional regulatory authority.  For much of that time, the individual 
states reserved significant authority to regulate immigrants and 
immigration under their traditional police powers—an authority premised 
                                                                                                                          
226 Id.  “[A]cting in the spirit of all our history and all our policy,” Justice Catron continued, 
Congress “has opened the door widely and invited the subjects of other countries to leave the crowded 
population of Europe and come to the United States.”  Id. at 442. 
227 Id. at 442. 
228 Id. at 461 (Grier, J., concurring in the judgment). 
229 Id. 
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not on immigrants’ status as foreigners, but rather on the purpose of the 
particular regulation at issue.  As potential paupers or carriers of disease, 
immigrants were simply persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and 
welfare of the community defined them, irrespective of citizenship, as 
objects of state police power.
230
     
As I argued in Part III, in the 1840s and 1850s, the same aspects of 
industrialization that appeared to threaten republican government 
generally—the concentration of population and economic production in the 
nation’s cities; growing poverty; and increasingly intense wage 
competition, often from foreign workers—unsettled the nation’s founding 
narrative of immigration as regeneration.  Nativists recast structural 
poverty as moral deficiency, impugning immigrants as indelibly alien to 
the American character.
231
  Notwithstanding the crescendo of nativism, 
however, the judgment that a large portion of foreigners were 
unassimilable had not yet taken hold among a broad swath of the American 
population.
232
  Even as the Know Nothings gained remarkable, if brief, 
electoral success, they failed to achieve their stated goal of restraining 
foreigners’ political influence by extending the period of residency 
required for naturalization.
233
  Indeed, the nativist fervor faded as rapidly 
as it had appeared, as sectional conflict over slavery and the enormous 
labor demands created by the Civil War eclipsed the mid-century nativist 
movement.
234
 
In this Part, I argue that when the same seismic social and economic 
upheavals that animated the nativism of the 1850s returned with a 
vengeance a generation later, they transformed both immigration policy 
and the nature of federal regulatory authority.  Sections A and B argue that, 
following the depression of 1873, policymakers, judges, and other 
observers increasingly concluded that mass economic dependency had 
overflowed the bounds of locality and become an entrenched problem of 
national scope.  At the very moment that Americans were proclaiming a 
national “crisis of foreign pauperism,” the Supreme Court declared that the 
laws under which the states had long administered the admission of 
foreigners were preempted by Congress’s exclusive authority to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations.
235
  As objects of federal commercial 
regulation, immigrants were thus recast as articles of commerce.
236
  The 
foreign commerce framework registered immigrants’ non-citizenship in a 
                                                                                                                          
230 Supra Part III. 
231 Supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes. 
232 Supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying notes. 
233 Supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
234 Supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes. 
235 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8; infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
236 Infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
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way that the state police power did not—after all, immigrants were articles 
of commerce with foreign nations precisely because they were transported 
to the United States from abroad—but nevertheless retained the purpose-
oriented analysis of the mid-century cases.
237
  It was the economic impact 
of immigration on the nation rather than immigrants’ non-citizenship per 
se that defined the nature and scope of federal authority.
238
  Sections C and 
D demonstrate that immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners, 
and their constitutional personhood eclipsed by their non-citizenship, only 
in the final decade of the nineteenth century.  I argue that the political 
construction of Chinese and “new” European immigrants as indelibly 
different from “old stock” Americans animated the Supreme Court’s 
reinvention of the federal immigration power as an instrument of national 
self-defense. 
A.  The “Crisis of Foreign Pauperism” 
Government officials and charity administrators had confronted 
intermittent episodes of widespread poverty since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, most acutely during the depression years between 1837 
and 1842, and again in 1857.
239
  Yet before the 1870s, such economic 
downturns were generally understood as aberrant and unnatural exceptions 
to an otherwise healthy and prosperous economy.
240
  The devastating 
depression triggered by the panic of 1873, however, changed the basic 
meaning of economic dependency, as mass poverty increasingly became 
understood as a chronic, entrenched feature of industrial America.
241
  The 
six-year depression was the longest and deepest in United States history,
242
 
and left as many as one-third of the nation’s workers jobless.243  
Widespread begging and dependence on charity, coupled with the growing 
assertiveness and radicalism of organized laborers, conjured for many 
observers the intractable social stratification and class conflict of Europe.
 
  
As charities struggled to assist unprecedented throngs of jobless, able-
bodied male heads of household, the nation’s vaunted ideals of economic 
mobility and personal independence seemed genuinely vulnerable.
244
 
                                                                                                                          
237 Infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
238 Infra Part IV.B and accompanying notes. 
239 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, OUT OF WORK: THE FIRST CENTURY OF UNEMPLOYMENT OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 9, 14 (1986).  
240 Id. at 32–38, 47. 
241 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE 
IN AMERICA 69 (1986); KEYSSAR, supra note 239, at 250–52. 
242 KATZ, supra note 241, at 69. 
243
 KEYSSAR, supra note 239, at 52. 
244 See DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 57–58 (1991).  During the 
last third of the nineteenth century, explains historian Dorothy Ross, the sharpening conflict between 
“the existence of a permanent working class” subject to the “vicissitudes of the business cycle” and the 
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Though it is evident in retrospect that the mass dependency of the 
1870s was attributable to a worldwide depression, declining wages and 
prices, and extraordinarily high levels of unemployment, a preponderance 
of contemporary observers focused on causes that were not so much 
economic as moral.  The culprit was not merely poverty, but rather a 
“crisis of pauperism”—a much more menacing phenomenon characterized 
by a deficit of virtue.
245
  As contemporaries diagnosed paupers’ 
fundamental moral unfitness for American economic and political life, they 
increasingly noted the presence of large numbers of foreigners among the 
emergent pauper class—an observation that quickly ripened into a full-
throated and nearly ubiquitous discourse of “foreign pauperism.”246  As the 
New York State Board of Charities observed in its first annual “Report on 
Alien Paupers” in 1875, a great “class of indolent and hereditary paupers  
. . . [has] been smuggled into our country by the connivance . . . of foreign 
nations.”247  These unnaturally selected European paupers, which were 
“unchanged in character and tendencies” and still bore the “stamp of their 
far-off origin,” could be “recognized by any thoughtful visitor to the homes 
of the poor, in our cities, and among the crowds who resort to the offices of 
the superintendents of the poor as eager applicants for outdoor relief.”248 
B.  Immigrants as Articles of Commerce 
The process of federalizing a regulatory domain that historically had 
been co-occupied, if somewhat uneasily, by both the states and the federal 
government, consisted of a succession of complementary moves by 
Congress and the Supreme Court.  Beginning in 1875, Congress enacted a 
series of statutes transferring immigration policymaking and administrative 
control from the states to the federal government.
249
  During the same 
                                                                                                                          
long-standing ideal of a classless, or at least highly fluid, social, and economic system gave rise to a 
“crisis in the national ideology of American exceptionalism.”  Id. at 53.  
245 Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 205. 
246 Id. at 211. 
247 STATE OF N.Y., EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF CHARITIES 137 (1875).  
The Report claimed that the “practice of pouring the scum of a population—the criminal classes and 
confirmed pauper classes—into the territory of a friendly state, is an invention of the very latest years.”  
Id.   
248 Id. at 112.  
249 See Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 7, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1551–74 (2006)) (transferring sole authority to administer immigration regulations to the 
federal government, and creating the Office of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization 
under the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury); Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 
(repealed 1952) (prohibiting the immigration of any foreigner who had entered into an employment 
contract with an American employer prior to departing his country of origin); Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1843) (prohibiting the entry of Chinese laborers into the United 
States for a period of ten years); Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551–74 (2006)) (transferring authority over the landing of immigrants from individual 
states to the United States Treasury Department); Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 
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period, the Supreme Court struck down several existing state regulations 
and upheld the new federal legislation.
250
  In so doing, the Justices reached 
unanimous consensus that the transportation of immigrants to the United 
States constituted commerce with foreign nations, and that Congress 
possessed exclusive authority to regulate that process.  
Following the Court’s decision in The Passenger Cases striking down 
the New York and Massachusetts head taxes, New York attempted to 
circumvent the constitutional infirmity by affording each ship owner or 
consignee the option of paying either a $300 bond that would be refunded 
after four dependency-free years, or a nonrefundable “commutation fee” of 
$1.50, for every passenger arriving from a foreign port.
251
  The amended 
law reached the Supreme Court in the 1875 case Henderson v. Mayor of 
New York.
252
  A unanimous Court held that because the “purpose and 
effect” of the New York scheme was to tax the landing of foreign 
passengers, it was no less unconstitutional that the head tax struck down in 
The Passenger Cases.
253
  The ever-growing commercial significance of 
immigrant labor to the nation’s material progress was essential.  As Justice 
Miller observed, 
the transportation of passengers from European ports to those 
of the United States has [in recent decades] attained a 
magnitude and importance far beyond its proportion at that 
time to other branches of commerce.  It has become a part of 
our commerce with foreign nations, of vast interest to this 
country, as well as to the immigrants who come among us to 
find a welcome and home . . . . In addition to the wealth 
which some of them bring, they bring still more largely the 
labor which we need to till our soil, build our railroads and 
develop the latent resources of the country . . . .
254
 
Gone was the earlier notion of “two distinct sovereignties” exercising 
                                                                                                                          
1974) (prohibiting the immigration of prostitutes, contract laborers, and convicts from “China, Japan, 
or any Oriental country”). 
250 See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (striking down state head 
taxes); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 278 (striking down a California statute empowering a state 
immigration commissioner to require a bond for immigrant women determined to be “lewd and 
debauched”); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (upholding the “head tax” provision of 
the federal Immigration Act of 1882).   
251 Each bond was to be used to indemnify the state against the cost of supporting that passenger 
for four years, at which time it would be returned.  As the state expected, ship owners invariably opted 
to pay the commutation fee.  See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and the 
Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, supra note 12, at 24 (describing New York State’s revision 
of its “head tax” law following The Passenger Cases). 
252 Henderson, 92 U.S. at 267.  
253 Id. at 268–69.  
254 Id. at 270. 
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“concurrent power” over immigration.255  For the Henderson Court, it was 
not the Constitution or the nature of national sovereignty that required 
federal exclusivity; rather, it was history. 
If Congress’s immigration power derived from the Commerce Clause, 
however, it was an authority that extended well beyond strictly commercial 
matters.  Notably, federal exclusivity would enable the United States to act 
as a single, unified sovereign in relation to foreign governments.  As 
Justice Miller explained, a law that impedes immigration “may properly be 
called international,” as it “belongs to that class of laws which concern the 
exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and 
governments.”256  Indeed, on the same day the Court decided Henderson, it 
struck down a California bond requirement similar to the New York 
scheme, declaring that the Constitution had not “done so foolish a thing” as 
to allow “a single State . . . , at her pleasure, [to] embroil us in disastrous 
quarrels with other nations.”257   
Henderson devastated New York’s ability to fund the administration of 
the Castle Garden Depot.  New York responded by abandoning its 
longstanding opposition to federal control over immigration and, joined by 
several other seaboard states, lobbied for swift and aggressive national 
action.
258
  Congress responded, somewhat belatedly, with the Immigration 
Act of 1882,
259
 transferring authority over the landing of immigrants from 
the states to the federal government; authorizing the Treasury Secretary to 
enter contracts with state immigration commissions to inspect incoming 
foreigners; and providing that a duty of fifty cents be collected from each 
foreign passenger to fund the administration of the Act and to assist sick or 
destitute immigrants.
260
   
The Supreme Court upheld the Act two years later, in Edye v. 
Robertson, known as The Head Money Cases.
261
  The Court’s unanimous 
                                                                                                                          
255 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 399 (1849) (McLean, J., concurring). 
256 Henderson, 92 U.S. at 273. 
257 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).  Under the California law, bonds were only 
required for specific classes of immigrants, including “lewd and debauched women”—the class to 
which the plaintiff, a Chinese woman, had been assigned.  Id. at 276.  The Court was particularly 
troubled by the potential for a single state to provoke an international conflict for which the national 
government would have to answer.  Id. at 280.  By placing “in the hands of a single [commissioner]” 
the authority to require or commute a bond, the Court worried, the California law empowered a lone 
state official “to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from carrying 
passengers, or to compel them to submit to the systematic extortion of the grossest kind.”  Id. at 278.  
Under such a scheme, “a silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring disgrace upon the 
whole country, the enmity of a power nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend.”  Id. at 279. 
258 Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 215–17. 
259 Immigration Act of 1882, Ch. 376, §§ 1–4, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.  
§§ 1551–56, 1571–74 (2006)). 
260 State commissioners would examine passengers and exclude “any convict, lunatic, idiot, or 
any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge.”  Id. § 2. 
261 112 U.S. 580 (1884).  
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opinion—again authored by Justice Miller—further defined the nature and 
scope of Congress’s authority to regulate immigration under its commerce 
power.  In reply to the plaintiff ship master’s argument that the fifty-cent 
duty was an unconstitutional “direct tax,” lacking in uniformity and 
imposed for a “purpose [that] has nothing to do with the general welfare,” 
the Court observed: 
The burden imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the 
mere incident of the regulation of commerce—of that branch 
of foreign commerce which is involved in immigration . . . . 
Its provisions, from beginning to end, relate to the subject of 
immigration, and they are aptly designed to mitigate the evils 
inherent in the business of bringing foreigners to this country, 
as those evils affect both the immigrant and the people 
among whom he is suddenly brought and left to his own 
resources.
262
 
Thus recast as “the business of bringing foreigners” to the United States, 
immigration qua immigration became a branch of commerce with foreign 
nations, and thus the exclusive province of Congress. 
As Justice Miller’s reference to the “evils” inherent in immigration 
suggest, this great stream of international commerce carried not only 
valuable immigrant labor, but also the substantial burden of supporting the 
foreign “poor and helpless.”263  To endorse the plaintiff ship master’s 
contention that Congress, too, lacked the power to tax foreign passengers, 
Justice Miller concluded, would be  
to hold that [the power] does not exist at all; that the framers 
of the constitution have so worded that remarkable 
instrument that the ships of all nations . . . can, without 
restraint or regulation, deposit here . . . the entire European 
population of criminals, paupers, and diseased persons, 
without any provision to preserve them from starvation, and 
its concomitant sufferings.
264
 
This rendering of the federal immigration power incorporates within the 
nationalizing rubric of foreign commerce the formerly local, 
geographically and temporally discreet, immigration problems of 
pauperism and crime.  The Court’s vision of a foreign population of 
chronic dependents being thrown upon the public stands in sharp contrast 
to the nation’s earlier faith that, so long as immigrants were dispersed 
among the native population, they would in time be absorbed into the 
                                                                                                                          
262 Id. at 595. 
263 Id. at 591. 
264 Id. 
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tissues of the body politic and transformed into virtuous, patriotic 
republicans.  
On the one hand, the federal immigration power set forth in The Head 
Money Cases and Henderson suggests that immigrants’ foreignness was 
beginning to shape the authority to which they, as immigrants, were 
subject: first, the discourse of “foreign pauperism” cast the implications of 
mass economic dependency in increasingly national terms; and second, 
immigrants constituted articles of commerce with foreign nations precisely 
because they were transported to the United States from abroad.  In this 
respect, we might understand the foreign commerce rationale for federal 
exclusivity to have edged the federal immigration power toward the 
discourse of national sovereignty that anchors the plenary power doctrine.  
On the other hand, and in marked contrast to the inherent sovereignty 
regime, the foreign commerce framework retained the purpose-oriented 
analysis of Miln and The Passenger Cases.  It was the perceived economic 
impact of immigration, for better and worse, that defined the nature and 
scope of federal authority.   Immigrants’ non-citizenship remained 
incidental, or at least secondary, to the Court’s understanding of 
congressional authority.  In this respect, then, the commerce rationale of 
the 1870s and 1880s represents less a step toward immigration 
exceptionalism than an extension of the mid-century decisions. 
C.  “Imported” Labor and the Problem of Indelible Difference 
Section B argued that, even after immigrants were legally 
reconstructed as articles of commerce in the 1870s and 1880s, the essential 
premise of federal authority was not immigrants’ foreignness, but rather 
the commercial importance of the immigration system.
265
  It was only in 
the final decade of the nineteenth century that immigrants’ foreignness per 
se came to dictate the source, locus, and scope of Congress’s—and, by 
delegation, the President’s—regulatory authority.  This Section argues that 
immigrants were legally reconstructed as foreigners, and their 
constitutional personhood eclipsed by their non-citizenship, as they 
became understood as fundamentally and permanently alien to the national 
character.  
As Part III discussed, the United States’s traditional policy of open 
borders, as well as the reservation of most immigration regulation to the 
individual states, rested on a broad confidence that an open continent, easy 
access to land, and liberal exposure to republican values and institutions 
would assimilate all comers.
266
  In the 1880s and 1890s, however, a 
growing chorus of observers lamented that the Jeffersonian vision of 
                                                                                                                          
265 Supra Part IV.B. 
266 Supra Part III.A.1. 
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virtuous citizenship rooted in property ownership and independent labor 
was fading into history.  “[T]he conditions have changed utterly from the 
days when the supply of vacant land was indefinite, the demand for labor 
almost unbounded, and the supply of people very limited,”267 counseled 
Henry Cabot Lodge, a leading congressional advocate of immigration 
restriction.  For Lodge and his contemporaries, industrialization had 
rendered independent labor—and with it, the promise of assimilation—a 
relic of the past.  The belief that “the earth is the great disinfectant,” 
explained the economist Richmond Mayo-Smith, “and that all we need to 
do is get these depraved dregs of European civilization on to the land in 
order to reform them—it is in this early civilization that this saying is 
true.”268 
If the industrial reorganization of life and labor caused contemporaries 
to doubt the regenerative power of American economic and political 
culture, however, legislators and others increasingly focused on the alleged 
character deficiencies of immigrants themselves.  As we have seen, in the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century this critique centered on the 
importation from Europe of “foreign paupers.”  Beginning in the 1870s in 
the western states, and the 1880s in the northeast, contemporaries turned 
their attention to a new, more menacing phenomenon that they dubbed, 
variably, the “coolie trade” (for Chinese laborers) or the “crisis of foreign 
pauper labor” (for Europeans).269  Unlike the “foreign paupers” whose 
economic dependency had long drawn the attention of lawmakers and 
charity administrators, Chinese “coolies” and European “pauper laborers” 
offended through an excess of economic competitiveness.  Because they 
were willing to work for virtually any wage, critics charged, they robbed 
“American” workers of the ability to provide their families with a 
“civilized” standard of living, and thereby degraded not only the labor 
market, but also the economic independence of the citizenry—the 
cornerstone of virtuous citizenship.
270
  As we will see in Section D, this 
critique propelled both the legal reconstruction of foreignness and the 
Court’s discovery of an extra-constitutional regulatory authority inherent in 
the nation’s sovereignty.  
Because the Supreme Court adopted the plenary power doctrine in a 
case upholding Chinese exclusion, and did so in terms that appeared to 
endorse Congress’s racist rationale for that policy, it is tempting to 
                                                                                                                          
267 Henry Cabot Lodge, The Restriction of Immigration, 152 N. AM. REV. 27, 34 (1891). 
268 Richmond M. Smith, Control of Immigration, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 409, 413 (1888). 
269 “Coolie” was a generally derogatory but very common term for Chinese laborers.  Beginning 
in the mid-nineteenth century, it was used “to designate some sort of contract labor, but [was more 
often] used to convey the idea of servitude, slavery or peonage.”  MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE, CHINESE 
IMMIGRATION 41 (1909).  
270 Id. at 221–22. 
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understand the doctrine merely as the legal expression of the anti-Chinese 
racism that pervaded Gilded-Age political culture.  Indeed, the author of 
the decision, Justice Stephen Field, was himself a native Californian who 
made no secret of his concern about the destruction of “white labor” by 
“vast hordes” of degraded Chinese.271  But to reduce the Court’s 
unanimous opinion in The Chinese Exclusion Case to its author’s hostility 
toward Chinese immigrants misses the full meaning and stakes of 
immigration regulation for late-nineteenth century judges and legislators.  
Nor does it account for the Court’s adoption of a constitutionally 
exceptional regulatory authority that the Justices knew would apply 
primarily to immigration from Europe.  Rather, as this Section 
demonstrates, the political construction of European pauper laborers in 
many ways paralleled Americans’ contemporaneous condemnation of the 
“servile” Chinese.  Together, they depicted an invasion of the United 
States by uncivilized, racially degraded, citizenship-destroying foreign 
laborers. 
1.  The “Servile” Chinese 
The political origins of Chinese Exclusion lie in the American West of 
the 1870s, in a ferocious anti-Chinese movement led by the Workingmen’s 
Party of California.  By the end of the decade, anti-Chinese legislators in 
California had amended the state constitution to permit a host of repressive 
measures, including the exclusion of Chinese from certain occupations and 
the forced relocation of resident Chinese into ghettos.  The California 
legislature also aggressively lobbied the U.S. Congress to enact a national 
exclusion law.
272
  In 1876, the California Senate adopted a “Memorial” 
titled The Social, Moral and Political Effect of Chinese Immigration.
273
  
The Memorial captures the meaning that cheap foreign labor held for the 
future of American citizenship and for the nation’s historical narrative of 
immigration as regeneration.  As with new European pauper laborers, the 
                                                                                                                          
271 In an 1884 case, in which the Supreme Court sustained a Chinese immigrant’s challenge to a 
particularly harsh application of the Chinese Exclusion Act, Justice Field wrote a long dissent 
describing what he considered the distinctly destructive characteristics of Chinese laborers.  “[T]hey 
had a wonderful capacity to live in narrow quarters without injury to their health,” he explained, and 
were “perfectly satisfied with what would hardly furnish a scanty subsistence to our laborers and 
artisans.”  Chew Heong, 112 U.S. 536, 565–66 (1884).  Congress thus adopted a policy of Chinese 
exclusion in order to interrupt “the certainty” that “vast hordes would pour in upon us, overrunning our 
coast and controlling its institutions.  A restriction upon their further immigration was felt to be 
necessary to prevent the degradation of white labor, and to preserve ourselves the inestimable benefits 
of our Christian civilization.”  Id. at 569. 
272 On the political history of the California anti-Chinese movement, and especially the role of 
organized labor, see ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-
CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 68–78 (1971). 
273 COMM. OF SENATE OF CAL., CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL 
EFFECT ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION (1877) [hereinafter MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA]. 
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so-called “servile” Chinese raised the monumental question of whether a 
competitive market in wage labor was compatible with republican 
citizenship.  The Memorial’s political construction of Chinese laborers 
became an archetype for the threatened degradation of American 
citizenship by cheap foreign labor, and previewed the ultimately successful 
arguments in Congress a few years later in favor of both Chinese exclusion 
and the exclusion of European “contract laborers.”  
California lawmakers, as well as a growing cross-section of American 
judges, labor spokesmen, and economists, concluded that Chinese labor 
threatened not only American workers, but also American citizenship.
274
  
To understand why, it is essential to appreciate the ideologically freighted 
meaning that wage labor had acquired in the years following the Civil War.  
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the early republican vision of 
citizenship rooted in self-employment and the ownership of real property 
gradually gave way, as industrialization transformed farmers and craftsmen 
into wage workers.
275
  As the traditional Jeffersonian prerequisites for 
independent citizenship became less broadly attainable, however, 
Americans did not abandon independence as an essential component of 
citizenship; rather, they redefined it.  By the 1870s, there had emerged a 
general consensus among congressional Republicans and political 
intellectuals in the north and south alike that the sale of one’s labor was an 
expression of self-ownership.  The wage contract, long thought 
incongruous with virtuous citizenship, had become instead a token of 
individual economic freedom.
276
  Critically, however, the new 
                                                                                                                          
274 See id. at 41−42 (describing the corrosive effect Chinese laborers have on the culture of 
American labor).  
275 See supra notes 25−30 and accompanying text; see also SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS 
DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788–1850 107–
08 (1984) (describing the rise of industrial culture in Manhattan).  By the postbellum era, a majority of 
male workers labored for a wage for the first time in the Nation’s history.  DAVID MONTGOMERY, 
BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS, 1862–1872 28–30 (1967). 
276 See NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865–1914 29 (2002); 
LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF CONSUMER 
SOCIETY 17–34 (1997); STANLEY, supra note 41, at 75−77.  Perhaps as much as any other factor, the 
conflict over slavery transformed the cultural and ideological meaning of the wage contract.  
Abolitionists extolled the voluntary exchange of one’s labor for a wage as the antithesis of slavery.  
The compulsion inherent in the slave system, they argued, violated the fundamental tenets of both 
economic morality and human nature, denying the right of man to govern himself, to enjoy bodily 
integrity, to own property, and to dispose of his labor at market price.  Consent became the language of 
individual freedom, and thus acquired the moral and emotional weight of opposing human bondage.  
See STANLEY, supra note 41, at 4−5; RONALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTI-SLAVERY APPEAL: AMERICAN 
ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830 121–23 (1978); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor 
and Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 785−86 (1985).  While this collective redefinition 
of independence reflected a general consensus, it was by no means unanimous, as organized labor 
continued to contest the easy equation of personal freedom with the wage contract.  See DANIEL T. 
ROGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850–1920 155–68 (1978); STANLEY, supra note 
41, at 68–70.  
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compatibility of wage labor and personal independence was subject to the 
essential condition that a man’s wage be sufficient to sustain a respectable 
standard of living for himself and his family. 
Against this ideological backdrop, wage competition between white 
and Chinese workers served as a referendum on the moral integrity of the 
industrial labor system.  The crux of the problem, critics believed, was 
Chinese laborers’ uncivilized standards of living.  White laborers, 
American and European alike, “cannot compete with Chinese labor,” the 
California Memorial explained.  The reason was not “any deficiency of 
skill or will” on the part of white laborers, but rather their fidelity to the 
“mode of life hitherto considered essential for our American 
civilization.”277  Critics cited Chinese and white laborers’ respective diets, 
in particular, as a source of competitive unfairness and a measure of fitness 
for citizenship.  “Our laborers require meat and bread, which [are] . . . 
necessary to that mental and bodily strength [that] is . . . important in the 
citizens of a republic,” the Memorial reported, “while the Chinese require 
only rice, dried fish, tea, and a few simple vegetables.”278  The residential 
habits of the Chinese were no better, characterized by “moral degradation,” 
“the most disgusting licentiousness,” and “the absolute certainty of 
pestilence arising from the[ir] crowded condition and filthy habits of  
life.”279  “To compete with the Chinese,” the Memorial concluded, “our 
laborer must be entirely changed in character, in habits of life, in 
everything that the Republic has hitherto required him to be.”280  White 
laborers would not be “induced to live like vermin.”281  
Congressional advocates of Chinese exclusion sounded the same 
theme a few years later.  Nevada Senator John P. Jones quoted at length 
from a letter he had received from a miner:    
The forces of our civilization have . . . given me enough to 
support [my] wife and [four] children in . . . decency and 
comfort. . . . I have separate rooms in which the children may 
sleep; my wife must be clothed so that she does not feel 
ashamed in mixing with her neighbors; the children must be 
clothed as befits decency and order and the grade of 
civilization in which we live, and we must have a variety of 
                                                                                                                          
277 THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, CHINESE IMMIGRATION:  THE SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL 
EFFECT ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION; POLICY AND MEANS OF EXCLUSION, MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE 
OF CALIFORNIA TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 41(1877) [hereinafter MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA]. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 7. 
280 Id. at 42. 
281 Id. at 41.  “[O]ur laborer has an individual life, cannot be controlled as a slave by brutal 
masters, and this individuality has been required of him by the genius of our institutions, and upon 
these elements of character the State depends for defense and growth.”  Id.  
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food to which we have been accustomed and a taste for 
which we have inherited from our ancestors. . . . While my 
work is very arduous I go to it with a light heart [because] . . . 
I am in the hopes to bring up my daughters to be good wives 
and faithful mothers, and to offer my sons better 
opportunities in life than I had myself.
282
 
Servile Chinese labor jeopardized not only the rate of wages paid to 
American workers, Jones suggested, but the very pillars of American 
civilization and citizenship: self-respect, social order and, not least, the 
promise to future generations of upward economic mobility.  “You cannot 
introduce Chinese wages and Chinese laborers without bringing in Chinese 
conditions, social and political,”283 Jones warned.  Chinese exclusion 
would therefore be “a blow struck at degraded, under-paid, under-clothed, 
and under-fed labor, and it is a blow in favor of that fair remuneration 
which the forces of our civilization up to this hour have decreed that the 
laborer should get.”284 
As the California legislature saw it, the problem was not the wage 
labor system per se, but rather the state of unfreedom in which Chinese 
laborers arrived on the economic playing field.  The “trite saying . . . that 
competition in labor is healthful” may be true enough, the Memorial 
declared, but competition could not exist “between free and slave labor; 
and the Chinese in California are substantially in a condition of 
servitude.”285  Chinese laborers were “imported here by large companies 
under contracts,” for the duration of which they were, “to all intents, serfs, 
. . . let out to service at a miserable pittance to perform the labor that it 
ought to be the privilege of our own race to perform.”286  “Even were it 
possible for the white laborer to maintain existence upon the wages paid to 
the Chinese,” the Memorial continued, “his condition nevertheless 
becomes that of an abject slave, for grinding poverty is absolute 
slavery.”287  Under such conditions, “[t]he vaunted ‘dignity of labor’ 
                                                                                                                          
282 13 CONG. REC. 1741 (1882) (statement of Sen. Jones).  
283 Id. at 1743. 
284 Id.  Senator Jones went on to explain why American workers might rationally prefer to 
compete with poor Europeans rather than poor Chinese:  
European laborers, men of their own race, while they increase the supply of labor, 
also increase in nearly as great a proportion the demand for the products of labor.  
On the other hand, while the incoming of the . . . “little brown man” tends to glut the 
labor market to the full extent of his increased numbers, to nothing like the same 
extent as the European does he increase the demand for products.   
Id. 
285 MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 277, at 5. 
286 Id. at 5–6. 
287 Id. at 6. 
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becomes a bitting [sic] sarcasm”288 and a “burlesque on the policy of 
emancipation.”289 
Under the traditional theory of immigration as regeneration, Chinese 
laborers perhaps could have been redeemable.  Notwithstanding their 
alleged virtual slavery and degraded habits of life, in an earlier time liberal 
exposure to republican values and institutions might have awakened their 
“dormant seed of virtue,” transforming them into valuable and loyal 
members of the polity, if not citizens.
290
  Indeed, as the Memorial 
acknowledged, the United States had long “invited the people of foreign 
countries to our borders . . . with the well founded hope that they would, in 
time, by association with our people, and through the influence of our 
public schools, become assimilated to our native population.”291  In the 
case of the Chinese, however, the seed of virtue was not merely dormant; it 
was nonexistent.  “Their code of morals, their forms of worship, and their 
maxims of life,” hardened over millennia by the “iron manacles of caste,” 
now stood as “a barrier against which the elevating tendency of a higher 
civilization exerts itself in vain.”292  From an “ethnological point of view,” 
the Memorial explained, “there can be no hope that any contact with our 
people, however long continued, will ever conform them to our 
institutions, enable them to comprehend or appreciate our form of 
government, or to assume the duties or discharge the functions of 
citizens.”293  Notwithstanding a quarter-century living alongside white 
Californians, the Chinese thus remained “the same stolid Asiatics that have 
floated on the rivers and slaved in the fields of China for thirty centuries of 
                                                                                                                          
288 Id.  
289 Id. at 7.  In Congress, too, references to slavery abounded.  Senator John Miller, a California 
Republican and sponsor of the Senate bill that would become the Chinese Exclusion Act, urged that, 
were the bill to fail, “all the speculators in human labor, all the importers of human muscle, all the 
traffickers in human flesh [will] ply their infamous trade without impediment . . . and empty the 
teeming, seething slave pens of China upon the soil of California!”  13 CONG. REC. 1482 (1882) 
(statement of Sen. Miller) (quoted in COOLIDGE, supra note 269, at 168). 
290 Under the provision of the Naturalization Act of 1790 limiting naturalization to “free white 
person[s],” Chinese immigrants were prohibited from becoming naturalized United States citizens.  
Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
291 MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 277, at 14. 
292 Id. at 6–7.  The Memorial continued:  
[T]he Chinese who inundate our shores are, by the very constitution of their nature, 
by instinct, by the traditions of their order for thousands of years, serfs.  They never 
rise above that condition in their native land, and by the inexorable degrees of caste, 
never can rise.  Servile labor to them is their natural and inevitable lot.  Hewers of 
wood and drawers of water they have been since they had a country, and servile 
laborers they will be to the end of time.   
Id. at 6. 
293 Id. at 7.   
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time[,] . . . [i]mpregnable to all the influences of our Anglo-Saxon life.”294  
Senator Jones was likewise incredulous that “[t]hese people, indurated and 
buried under fifty centuries of stagnation, petrified in oppressive forms and 
oppressive systems, are to be made good citizens of the United States in 
one single generation!”295 
In the context of the Chinese problem, the uneasy compatibility 
between the industrial labor system, on the one hand, and the health of 
republican civilization and citizenship, on the other, took on an urgent air 
of racial contingency.  The Memorial sought to clarify the stakes: 
Are we engaged in building up a civilized empire, founded 
upon and permeated with the myriad influences of Caucasian 
culture; or are we merely planted here for the purpose of 
fighting greedily, each for his own hand, and of spoiling a 
country for whose future we have no care?  If the latter, then 
indeed we should welcome Chinese labor, and should 
encourage its advent until it had driven white labor out of the 
field.  But if we have higher duties; if we owe obligations to 
our race, to our civilization, to our kindred blood, to all that 
proclaims our common origin and testifies to the harmony 
                                                                                                                          
294 Id.  The Memorial elaborated at length on the self-enforced insularity of the Chinese and their 
failure to absorb American values and institutions:   
[T]hey remain separate, distinct from, and antagonistic to our people in thinking, 
mode of life, in tastes and principles, and are as far from assimilation as when they 
first arrived. 
They fail to comprehend our system of government; they perform no duties of 
citizenship; they are not available as jurymen, cannot be called upon as a posse 
comitatus to preserve order, nor be relied upon as soldiers. 
They do not comprehend or appreciate our social ideas, and they contribute but little 
to the support of any of our institutions, public or private.   
They bring no children with them, and there is, therefore, no possibility of 
influencing them by our ordinary educational appliances. 
There is, indeed, no point of contact between the Chinese and our people through 
which we can Americanize them.  The rigidity which characterizes these people 
forbids the hope of any essential change in their relations to our own people or our 
government. 
Id. at 15. 
295 13 CONG. REC. 1741 (1882) (statement of Sen. Jones).  Indeed, faced with the prospect of 
unchecked Chinese immigration, Senator Jones saw cause to doubt the ostensible liberal universalism 
of the Declaration of Independence—the favorite authority of the bill’s critics.  Id. at 1740.  The fact 
that the Constitution sanctioned slavery, he argued, served to rebut any suggestion that “the authors of 
the Declaration of Independence intended to say that all men of all races were equal, and that they were 
entitled to come to this country at their pleasure.”  Id.  On the contrary, “[w]henever this country 
believes that the incoming of a race . . . is inimical to the best interests of our people, then the time has 
come and the power is inherent to remedy the threatened evil.”  Id.  On the impulse of immigration 
critics to revisit the supposedly “universal” principles of the past, see SMITH, supra note 23, at 360–62; 
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 238–42. 
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and consistence of our aims—then assuredly we must decide 
that the Chinaman is a factor hostile to the prosperity, the 
progress and the civilization of the American people.
296
   
Would Congress direct national immigration policy toward the good of the 
whole public—the guiding light of republicanism—or would it succumb to 
the unbridled greed and unrestrained competition that, for many critics, 
increasingly characterized industrial America?  Because “the safety of our 
institutions depends upon the homogeneity, culture, and moral character of 
our people,”297 the Memorial concluded, the American political fellowship 
“must necessarily be limited by race, nationality and kindred 
civilization.”298  “[F]ree institutions are a monopoly of the favored races,” 
Senator Jones agreed, because none but the Caucasian race was “capable of 
creating them; no other race is capable of perpetuating them; no other race 
is capable of treading freedom’s heights with firm and unwavering step.”299   
It was this indictment of the Chinese—with its inextricable fusion of 
economic, racial, and political deficiencies—that spawned the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882.
300
  The Act barred entry of Chinese laborers into 
the United States for a period of ten years, and required any Chinese 
laborer then present in the country who wished to depart and subsequently 
return to obtain a certificate of reentry.
301
  
                                                                                                                          
296 MEMORIAL OF THE SENATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 277, at 45. 
297 Id. at 14. 
298 Id. 
299 13 CONG. REC. 1742 (1882) (statement of Sen. Jones).  For Jones and other members of 
Congress, racial inheritance was destiny: 
This race of ours has been struggling for centuries upon centuries for the principles 
of liberty.  It found this country a wilderness.  Our forefathers made great sacrifices 
to found the institutions which we enjoy.  With unequaled valor they faced all the 
rude forces of nature; they confronted and overcame the wild Indian and the wild 
beast; they subdued the soil, and we, their descendants, on a hundred battle-fields 
have fought to preserve the precious inheritance bequeathed by them . . . . 
Id. 
300 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1952).  Congress first passed 
the so-called Fifteen Passenger Bill in 1879, capping at fifteen the number of Chinese passengers each 
steamship could land in the United States.  See COOLIDGE, supra note 269, at 135–39.  President Hayes 
vetoed the bill, however, on the ground that it violated the 1868 Burlingame Treaty between the United 
States and China, which recognized the “inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and 
allegiance” and promised to extend to each other’s citizens the same privileges and immunities as 
citizens of the most favored nation.  Treaty with China, U.S.-China, art. V–VII, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 
739, 740 [hereinafter Burlingame Treaty].  President Hayes then sent a commission to China to 
renegotiate the agreement.  The commission returned the following year with a new treaty permitting 
the United States to “regulate, limit, or suspend,” though “not absolutely prohibit” the entry of Chinese 
laborers.  Treaty Between the United States and China, Concerning Immigration, U.S.-China, art. I, 
Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, 826.  
301 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 58–60 (repealed 1952).  After federal 
judges in San Francisco created a broad set of exemptions to the certificate requirement, Congress 
amended the statute two years later, in 1884, to clarify that the certificate was the “only evidence 
permissible to establish [a] right of reentry.”  Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 116 (1884) 
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2.  “New” European Immigrants and the “Crisis of Foreign Pauper 
Labor” 
As a matter of federal policy, the near-total exclusion of Chinese 
laborers from the United States was singularly draconian.  The basic terms 
in which American lawmakers and others condemned the menace of the 
servile Chinese, however, were far from unique, and bear remarkable 
parallels with the nearly contemporaneous political construction of 
European “pauper laborers.”302  The critique of European pauper labor 
crystallized in the mid-1880s, in congressional debate over what would 
become the Contract Labor Act of 1885.  That Act, known as the Foran 
Act after its sponsor, Ohio Representative Martin Foran, prohibited the 
immigration of aliens who had entered into a labor contract prior to 
departing for the United States.
303
  In introducing the bill in the House of 
Representatives, Representative Foran began with “a general proposition 
that can not be controverted, that the rate of wages determines the social, 
moral, and intellectual status of a people.”304  “High wages signify 
intelligence, ingenuity, invention, and a higher order of manhood,” he 
explained, while “[l]ow wages signify debasement, ignorance, degradation, 
brutality.”305  “Cheapen labor and you destroy the incentive that spurs men 
to effort and improvement,” resulting in “cheap men, ignorant, degraded, 
dangerous citizens.”306  In an era in which wage labor had become the 
norm rather than a disreputable exception, the receipt of a wage adequate 
to support a respectable standard of living had become a sufficient material 
basis for virtuous citizenship. 
                                                                                                                          
(repealed 1943).  On the construction of the certificate requirement in the lower federal courts, see 
LUCY SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN 
IMMIGRATION LAW 18–20 (1995). 
302 I have previously explored this theme at length.  See Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: 
Sovereignty, Security, and the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, supra note 12, at 33–40; 
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic, supra note 146, at 220–50. 
303 The Foran Act made it unlawful “to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration of any alien . . . under contract or agreement . . . made previous 
to the importation or migration of such alien . . . to perform labor or service of any kind.”  Contract 
Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (repealed 1952). 
304 15 CONG. REC. 5351 (1884) (statement of Rep. Foran). 
305 Id.  
306 Id. Senator Orville Platt, a Connecticut Republican, further elaborated on the vital nexus 
between high wages and a man’s fitness for republican citizenship: 
[Y]ou must add to virtue and intelligence the prosperity of the citizen, if you expect 
the Republic to endure . . . . [T]o lower the standard of wages below fair 
remuneration is . . . vicious and destructive of republican institutions. . . . Up to this 
time those who have been willing to labor in this country under our system of free 
labor have been able to . . . comfortably clothe themselves and [their] families . . . 
[and] by thrift and prudence . . . secure a little home; attach themselves to the soil, 
and thus become conservative, patriotic citizens . . . . 
16 CONG. REC. 1781 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt). 
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With fitness for citizenship among the nation’s growing class of wage 
workers now measured, at least in part, by their capacity to maintain a 
respectable household, legislators, economists, labor leaders, and others 
directed unprecedented attention to immigrants’ “habits, customs [and] 
modes of living.”307  In this respect, congressional debate over the Foran 
Act echoed the construction of Chinese laborers two years earlier.  
Members of Congress frequently referred to reports purporting to 
document immigrant laborers’ dismal consumption habits, singling out the 
“new” immigrants from southern and eastern Europe for special 
condemnation.  Representative Foran cited accounts of Hungarian laborers 
“subsisting upon what an American laborer could not eat—such as mules, 
hogs, &c., which have been killed or died with cholera and other 
diseases.”308  “[T]he habits, morals, and modes of living of the Italians 
[are] of the same general character,” he reported.309  Francis Amasa 
Walker, the era’s preeminent political economist, lamented the “foreigner, 
making his way into the little village, bringing . . . not only a vastly lower 
standard of living, but too often an actual present incapacity to even 
understand the refinements of life and thought in the community in which 
he sought a home.”310  Foreign pauper laborers threatened to degrade 
American citizenship not because they were poor, but because they 
appeared incapable of even comprehending a civilized standard of 
living.
311
  
These critics routinely described European immigrants’ alleged 
incapacity to appreciate life’s creature comforts in terms of heredity and 
race.  Henry Cabot Lodge cautioned that “[t]he immigration of people of 
those races which contributed to the settlement and development of the 
                                                                                                                          
307 15 CONG. REC. 5350 (1884). 
308 Id.  
309 Id.  
310 Francis A. Walker, Immigration and Degradation, 11 FORUM 634, 641 (1891).  
311 The Supreme Court offered a similar assessment in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States, clarifying the class of immigrant laborers excluded under the Foran Act. 143 U.S. 457, 464–65 
(1892).  The Court explained that the purpose of the Act was to “raise the standard of foreign 
immigrants, and to discountenance the immigration of those who had not sufficient means in their own 
hands . . . to pay their passage.”  Id. at 464.  Quoting directly from the House committee report on the 
Act, the Court continued: 
This class of immigrants care[s] nothing about our institutions, and in many 
instances [has] never heard of them; they are men whose passage is paid by the 
importers . . . . [T]hey are ignorant of our social condition, and that they may remain 
so they are isolated and prevented from coming into contact with Americans.  They 
are generally from the lowest social stratum, and live upon the coarsest food and in 
hovels of a character before unknown to American workmen.  They, as a rule, do not 
become citizens, and are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body politic.  
The inevitable tendency of their presence among us is to degrade American labor, 
and reduce it to the level of the imported pauper labor. 
Id. at 465 (quoting 15 CONG. REC. 5359 (1884)). 
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United States is declining in comparison with that of races far removed in 
thought and speech and blood from the men who have made this country 
what it is.”312  As a consequence, he explained, “[w]e have now before us 
race problems which are sufficient to tax to the utmost the fortunate 
conditions with which nature has blessed us.”313  Walker agreed that the 
United States’ recent arrivals were “increasingly drawn from the nations of 
southern and eastern Europe—peoples which have got no great good for 
themselves out of the race wars of centuries,” and have thus “remained 
hopelessly upon the lowest plane of industrial life.”314   
Moreover, lawmakers frequently used the language of foreign invasion 
to describe an American citizenry in jeopardy of degradation.  Foreign 
pauper laborers were 
the Goths and Vandals of the modern era.  They come only to 
lay waste, to degrade, and to destroy.  They bring with them 
ignorance, degraded morals, a low standard of civilization, 
and no motive of intended American citizenship.  Like the 
vast flights of grasshoppers and locusts, . . . they sweep down 
upon our fields of labor to devour and strip from us the 
benefit of our customs and of the laws protecting American 
labor, and then take their flight again back to the breeding 
places from which they came.
315
 
The trope of invasion was more than just a colorful metaphor.  Indeed, as I 
demonstrate in Section D, the Supreme Court would soon adopt a 
constitutionally exceptional immigration power crafted expressly to repel 
foreign invasion.   
This Section has demonstrated that in the post-Civil War campaign 
against the “importation” of cheap foreign labor, immigrants’ foreignness 
per se became a token of fundamental, indelible moral difference.  Without 
the requisite economic conditions and racial material, simply exposing 
immigrants to republican political culture and institutions afforded little 
value as a force of assimilation.  Critics of the “servile” Chinese and 
pauper laborers of Europe reimagined the American polity as a social and 
political body, the health of which depended on the collective natural 
endowments of its constituent members.  From this perspective, the quality 
of American citizenship would be defined in opposition to and defended 
against the racially inferior, irreducibly foreign immigrant laborers that 
threatened to degrade it.  It was precisely this perception of national 
vulnerability—this sense of peaceful invasion by a foreign menace—that 
                                                                                                                          
312 22 CONG. REC. 2956 (1891) (statement of Rep. Lodge). 
313 Id.  
314 Walker, supra note 310, at 644. 
315 15 CONG. REC. 5369 (1884) (statement of Sen. Cutcheon).  
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gave rise to the modern federal immigration power. 
D.  A Power “Inherent in Sovereignty and Essential to Self-Preservation” 
The Supreme Court’s 1889 decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, titled The Chinese Exclusion Case by its author, Justice Stephen 
Field, reinvented the federal immigration power as an instrument of 
national self-defense.
316
  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Field 
fashioned the discourse of indelible foreignness into a remarkably durable 
rationale for immigration exceptionalism.  In so doing, the Court shifted 
federal authority to regulate immigration from its long-standing home in 
the Commerce Clause to the extra-constitutional concept of national 
sovereignty.
317
  With the Immigration Act of 1891 and various 
amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act, Congress, too, played an active, 
if underappreciated, role in claiming for itself the authority to legislate 
largely beyond the reach of judicial review. 
Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer, had lived in San Francisco from 
1875 until he departed for China on June 2, 1887.  He brought with him a 
certificate of reentry issued under the 1882 Act and 1884 amendments.
318
  
On October 1, 1888, while Chae Chan Ping was abroad, however, 
Congress again amended the Chinese Exclusion Act to prohibit any 
Chinese laborer who had resided in the United States and subsequently 
departed from ever returning.  The so-called Scott Act thus voided every 
certificate issued under the 1882 and 1884 statutes.
319
  Chae Chan Ping 
arrived in the port of San Francisco eight days later.  When he presented 
his certificate, the collector denied him entry on the ground that it “had 
been annulled and his right to land abrogated,”320 and detained him on 
board the passenger ship.  The case came before the Court on a writ of 
habeas corpus.
321
 
The legal question in dispute did not invite, let alone require, a 
reconstruction of the federal immigration power.  Chae Chan Ping argued 
that his exclusion violated the 1868 and 1880 treaties between the United 
States and China, providing that Chinese laborers currently present in the 
country “shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will . . . and 
shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions [as]  
                                                                                                                          
316 See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606–07 (1889).  
317 See id. at 604–05 (articulating the concept of national sovereignty).  
318 Id. at 582.  
319 See Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, § 2, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943).  
320 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582. 
321 Id. at 581.  Chae Chan Ping acknowledged the nation’s “inherent right [as] a sovereign power” 
to prohibit the entry of aliens into its territory—an authority derived, he noted, from Congress’s foreign 
commerce power—but insisted that such a right did not authorize the United States to revoke his 
“vested right to return.”  Id. at 585.  
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. . . citizens . . . of the most favored nation.”322  And in fact, Justice Field 
ultimately disposed of the basic question—whether Chae Chan Ping had a 
treaty-based right to re-enter the United States—in a single, apparently 
legally uncontroversial paragraph.
323
  If he had been so inclined, he could 
have left the matter there. 
Instead, Justice Field harnessed the discourse of indelible foreignness 
to remake Congress’s authority to regulate immigration, from a power to 
regulate foreign commerce to a power inherent in the nation’s sovereignty, 
essential to its self-preservation, and “conclusive upon the judiciary.”324  
Much of Justice Field’s opinion is an extended discourse on how Chinese 
immigrants’ uncivilized, servile habits of life and labor, all rooted in 
inexorable racial instincts, had made a mockery of the principle that every 
man had an “inherent and inalienable right . . . to change his home and 
allegiance.”325  Although the arrival of Chinese laborers in California 
initially had “proved to be exceedingly useful,”326 Justice Field explained, 
once they took up “various mechanical pursuits and trades,” they “came in 
competition with our artisans and mechanics, as well as our laborers in the 
field.”327  “[C]ontent with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for 
our laborers and artisans,” and without families to support, the labor 
market competition “between them and our people was . . . altogether in 
their favor.”328  Notwithstanding the liberal welcome extended to Chinese 
laborers under the treaty provisions, they “remained strangers in the land, 
residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages of 
their own country.”329  “The differences of race added greatly to the 
difficulties of the situation,” Justice Field continued, for “[i]t seemed 
impossible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in 
their habits or modes of living.”330  As the arrival of Chinese laborers 
continued “in numbers approaching the character of an Oriental invasion,” 
westerners worried that “at no distant day that portion of our country 
would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their 
                                                                                                                          
322 Immigration Treaty of 1880, U.S.-China, art. II, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. 
323 Justice Field conceded that the Scott Act directly contravened the 1868 and 1880 treaties, but 
concluded that this did not invalidate the Act.  Because the Constitution declares both treaties and acts 
of Congress “to be the supreme law of the land, and [gives] no paramount authority . . . to one over the 
other,” he reasoned, “the last expression of the sovereign will must control.”  The Chinese Exclusion 
Case, 130 U.S. at 600.  That analysis reflected the Court’s long-standing position, which it had 
reaffirmed only the previous term.  See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that 
when a treaty and federal statute conflict, the more recent one controls). 
324 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. 
325 Id. at 585 (quoting the Burlingame Treaty, supra note 300, art. V.). 
326 Id. at 594. 
327 Id.  
328 Id. at 595. 
329 Id.  
330 Id.  
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immigration.”331 
Only after describing the Chinese problem in detail did Justice Field 
turn to the nature of Congress’s regulatory authority.  The threat of foreign 
invasion served as the essential premise:  
To preserve its independence, and give security against 
foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of 
every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other 
considerations are to be subordinated.  It matters not in what 
form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from 
the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast 
hordes of its people crowding in upon us.
332
 
It bears emphasis that the authority to exclude foreigners was not at issue 
in the case.  As we have seen, the Court had recognized Congress’s 
authority to regulate immigration under its commerce power for more than 
a half century, and had reaffirmed that framework just five years earlier, in 
The Head Money Cases.
333
  Rather, the passage figures Chinese laborers 
not as articles of commerce, but as agents of foreign aggression.  In so 
doing, Justice Field collapses two essential distinctions: first, between the 
Chinese nation “acting in its national character” and “vast hordes” of 
Chinese subjects; and second, between alien friends and alien enemies.
334
     
In Justice Field’s formulation, Chinese immigrants’ irredeemable 
foreignness displaced the commercial character of the immigration system 
as an irreducible premise of the federal immigration power.  For all the 
discussion of the destructive effects of cheap, servile Chinese labor on 
American workers, at bottom the issue was not the regulation of 
commerce, but the defense of American sovereignty against foreign 
“encroachment” and “aggression”:   
[If] the government of the United States . . . considers the 
presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who 
will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and 
                                                                                                                          
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 606. 
333 See supra Part IV.B. 
334 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606.  The construction of Chinese laborers as agents 
of foreign aggression defies the basic rule of international law that “aliens are responsible only for . . . 
offences in which their nation bears a part,” in which case they become “alien enemies.”  The 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 510 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting).  Not even Justice Field suggests, 
however, that Chinese laborers were literally agents of China.  Even if Chinese laborers had been 
acting as agents of their home government, however, at the time the case was decided the United States 
had cordial relations with China, and only nine years earlier had entered into a treaty reaffirming that 
Chinese laborers then residing in the United States enjoyed “all the rights, privileges, immunities, and 
exemptions which are accorded to the citizens . . . of the most favored nation.”  Immigration Treaty of 
1880, supra note 322, art. II.  Under the law of nations, Chinese laborers were therefore “alien friends,” 
however undesirable they may have been to members of Congress or the Justices of the Supreme Court. 
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security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the 
time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which 
the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would 
render the necessity . . . only more obvious and pressing.  
The same necessity . . . may arise when war does not exist, 
and the same authority [applies] . . . . In both cases its 
determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.
335
 
As a measure taken to repel foreign aggression, the provision of the Scott 
Act voiding Chae Chan Ping’s certificate of reentry was authorized as “an 
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United 
States.”336  Perhaps most remarkably, Congress’s authority to exclude the 
subjects of a nation with which the United States was at peace, and who, at 
any rate, were not acting as agents of China, was now identical to 
Congress’s power to conduct war.  Chinese immigrants’ fundamental 
foreignness, marked by their racial difference and failure to assimilate, was 
the lynchpin.
337
 
Two years later, in 1891, two interrelated developments confirmed that 
this reconstructed, extra-constitutional immigration power was not 
confined to congressional efforts to repel the Chinese menace.  First, 
Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891,
338
 which precluded access 
to the federal courts for the mostly European migrants who would be 
denied entry by federal immigration inspectors.  Second, in Nishimura 
Ekiu v. United States,
339
 the Court upheld the 1891 Act’s virtual 
foreclosure of judicial review of administrative immigration decisions.  
Justice Gray began his opinion for the Court with a formulation of the 
federal immigration power that would serve as a rhetorical and doctrinal 
touchstone for the next century: 
                                                                                                                          
335 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. 
336 Id. at 609. 
337 After reconstructing the immigration power, Justice Field proceeded to retroactively revise the 
Court’s rationale in previous decisions upholding Congress’s authority to exclude undesirable classes 
of Europeans.  “The exclusion of paupers, criminals and persons afflicted with incurable diseases, for 
which statutes have been passed,” he wrote, “is only an application of the same power to particular 
classes of persons, whose presence is deemed injurious or a source of danger to the country.” Id. at 608.  
“[T]here has never been any question as to the power to exclude them,” he continued.  “The power is 
constantly exercised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation.”  Id.  
338 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.  The Act modified the existing immigration 
framework in three key respects.  First, it added “persons likely to become a public charge” to the 
previous list of excludable classes.  Id. § 1.  Second, it assigned exclusive authority to administer the 
immigration laws, including the inspection of immigrants, to a national Superintendent of Immigration 
lodged within the U.S. Treasury Department.  Id. § 7.  Third, and most important for the trajectory of 
the federal immigration power, it made final decisions of inspection officers “touching the right of any 
alien to land” subject to review only by the Superintendent of Immigration and the Secretary of the 
Treasury.  Id. § 8. 
339 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
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It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, 
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in 
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe.  In the United States this power is vested in the 
national government, to which the Constitution has 
committed the entire control of international relations, in 
peace as well as in war.
340
 
This, in a nutshell, is the inherent sovereignty rationale for our 
constitutionally exceptional federal immigration power.  Justice Gray 
proceeded to explain that this power is consigned to the “political 
department[s]” of government.341  As he put it, “the decisions of executive 
or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by 
Congress, are due process of law.”342  Under the police and commerce 
frameworks that prevailed throughout the nineteenth century, the purpose 
of the regulation at issue, rather than the identity of those regulated, 
determined the nature of the operative authority.  Under the inherent 
sovereignty model, the bare fact of an immigrant’s non-citizenship 
triggered a virtually unrestrained, extra-constitutional authority that was 
“conclusive upon the judiciary.”343  Two years later, in Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States,
344
 the Court extended this principle to cover not only the 
exclusion of foreigners but also the expulsion of resident aliens.
345
  There, 
the Court declared that “[t]he right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any 
class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace,” 
was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent 
nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare.”346 
                                                                                                                          
340 Id. at 659 (citations omitted). 
341 Id. 
342 Id. at 660.  Justice Gray explained: 
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreigners who have never 
been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the United States, 
nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, 
in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and 
executive branches of the national government. 
Id. 
343 See supra note 335 and accompanying text. 
344 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
345 Id. at 731–32. 
346 Id. at 711. 
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V.  CONCLUSION:  “SOVEREIGNTY” AND THE CONSTITUTION OF 
FOREIGNNESS 
When Congress regulates the right of non-citizens to enter or remain 
within United States territory, it does so based on an extra-constitutional 
authority “inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation.”347  In 
this formulation, the constitutional exceptionalism of the federal 
immigration power appears almost sui generis—in the words of the 
Supreme Court, a timeless “maxim of international law.”348  This Article 
challenges this central orthodoxy of modern constitutional immigration law 
in two ways.       
First, it reveals that the inherent sovereignty rationale came into being 
only in the 1880s and 1890s, after a century of constitutionally 
unexceptional state and federal authority.  Throughout much of the 
nineteenth century, the Court figured immigrants not as foreigners, but 
simply as persons, whose effect on the health, morals, and welfare of the 
community was, like that of other persons, citizens and non-citizens alike, 
subject to the police power of the individual states.  Even after the Court 
redefined immigrants as articles of commerce in the 1870s, it did not 
distinguish between human commercial goods transported from a 
neighboring state and those transported across an ocean.  The Commerce 
Clause, like the police power, was indifferent to citizenship.  When we 
look back at the state police and federal commerce frameworks today, after 
more than a century of plenary power, it is striking that the Court found 
nothing conceptually distinctive, let alone constitutionally exceptional, 
about a statute that regulates foreigners engaged in the process of 
immigration.  The decidedly unexceptional manner in which the law 
operated on foreigners traveling to and landing in the United States defies 
the constitutional singularity, so crucial to modern constitutional 
immigration law, of a distinct class of “immigration laws” that govern the 
admission and removal of foreigners.  
Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the Article denaturalizes the 
concept of foreignness that underwrites immigration exceptionalism.  For 
late-nineteenth century Americans, foreignness came to signify far more 
than the absence of citizenship.  As wage labor became ascendant in the 
post-Civil War era, and as “native” workers confronted increasingly 
intense wage competition from recent immigrants, legislators, judges, labor 
leaders, and social scientists began to doubt both the regenerative power of 
American economic and political culture and, most importantly, the moral 
natures of immigrants themselves.   Contemporaries concluded that simply 
exposing immigrants to republican institutions afforded little value as a 
                                                                                                                          
347 Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. 
348 Id. 
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force of assimilation if the requisite economic conditions and racial 
material were lacking.  As Americans reimagined their polity as a social 
and political body, the health of which depended less on the vitality of its 
economic and political life than on the collective natural endowments of its 
constituent members, foreignness itself became a token of fundamental, 
indelible moral difference.  The Supreme Court then translated the 
discourse of indelible foreignness into a potent and durable rationale for 
immigration exceptionalism, forging the immigration power into an 
instrument of national “self-preservation” to be deployed against invading 
armies of racially degraded, economically and politically unassimilable 
foreigners.   
Even today, generations after the United States abandoned Chinese 
exclusion and national origins quotas, immigrants’ constitutional 
estrangement—the principle that foreignness per se rightly dictates the 
nature of the authority to which they are subject—remains an axiomatic 
feature of the federal immigration power.  For modern judicial and 
scholarly defenders of immigration exceptionalism, the indecorous rhetoric 
that clutters the historical origins of the plenary power doctrine does not 
diminish its legal soundness and continued legitimacy.  Once we strip 
away the Court’s racism and the overwrought metaphor of alien invasion, 
the argument runs, there remains, as a logical concomitant of national 
sovereignty, an inherent power to govern the admission and expulsion of 
non-citizens.  After all, outside of the Naturalization Clause the 
Constitution is silent on the federal government’s power to regulate 
immigration; but such authority must exist somewhere.   
Yet even if one concedes that the principle of territorial sovereignty 
implies an authority to govern the right of non-citizens to enter into and 
remain within territory, it is unclear why the exercise of such authority also 
requires that immigrants be denied important constitutional rights to which 
they, as persons, would otherwise be entitled.  (Recall that for the fifteen 
years preceding the Court’s decision in The Chinese Exclusion Case, 
Congress already enjoyed exclusive authority to regulate immigration 
under the commerce power.)  Why should a body of federal law concerned 
overwhelmingly with ordinary matters of labor, economic dependency, and 
crime—the issues that dominate the vast majority of immigration 
regulation—be “conclusive upon the judiciary”?  Why would we consign a 
regulatory domain dominated by patently unexceptional subject matter to 
the “political branches” of government, where it is buffered against 
judicially enforceable constitutional constraints?   This Article 
demonstrates that it was the very same elements of Justice Field’s opinion 
that modern defenders of plenary power would like to dismiss as 
anachronistic dicta that enabled the Court to bridge the gaping chasm 
between its novel legal rationale for federal authority and the purpose and 
subject matter of most immigration lawmaking and enforcement.  It was 
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precisely immigrants’ fundamental, indelible foreignness—their racial 
difference, their inability to assimilate, their destructive effect on American 
citizenship—that gave substance to the metaphor of racial invasion, and 
thus to the analogy between immigration regulation and war.  Indeed, the 
tropes of invasion and war allude to Congress’s Article I authority to “repel 
Invasions” and “declare war” without strictly invoking them, thus 
summoning the tradition of judicial deference that accompanies these 
archetypal “political” powers.  The Court’s intemperate defense of 
American citizenship against invading foreign races cannot, therefore, be 
swept aside like some unseemly discursive debris of a bygone era, 
cluttering the logically sound foundation of immigration exceptionalism; 
rather, it is the cornerstone of the entire edifice. 
 
